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WRONG ABOUT EVERYTHING: THE
APPLICATION BY THE DISTRICT COURTS




"Inequitable conduct," which is often loosely referred to as "fraud
on the Patent Office," is a defense to patent infringement. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed
whether the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9(b) apply to pleadings alleging inequitable conduct. The
district courts that have addressed that question have held, with one
exception, that inequitable conduct must be plead with particularity in
accordance with Rule 9(b). The district courts reach this conclusion
either by concluding that inequitable conduct is fraud on the Patent
Office and thus constitutes "fraud" in terms of Rule 9(b), or by
assuming that requiring inequitable conduct to be plead with
particularity will further various public policies. They also uniformly
apply regional circuit law, as opposed to Federal Circuit law, in
determining the degree of detail required by Rule 9(b), and generally
require defendants to plead precisely the same kind of detail as in
typical fraud cases.
Assistant Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. J.D.
Northwestern University School of Law, 1988. The law firm of Yetter & Warden, L.L.P. is
gratefully acknowledged for its support during the summer of 2001. Prior to becoming a full-
time faculty member, Professor Hricik represented clients in patent litigation, first with Baker
& Botts, L.L.P., then as a founding partner of Slusser & Frost, and most recently with Yetter
& Warden. The title of this Article is inspired by I'm Wrong About Everything, a song by
John Wesley Harding on the compact disc THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. ACE. The superior
research of Zack Thomas and Alexandra Geczi is gratefully acknowledged.
1. See Agere Sys. Guardian Corp v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 726, 733-34 (D. Del.
2002) ("[Tlhe Federal Circuit has not ruled on whether Rule 8(a) or Rule 9(b) applies to
allegations of inequitable conduct."); Nortel Networks Ltd. v. Kyocera Wireless Corp., No.
3:02-CV-0032-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17845, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2002) ("Absent
intervening Federal Circuit precedent, the court adhered to its earlier" conclusion that Rule
9(b) applies).
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The district courts in this line of cases are wrong about everything.
This Article concludes that Rule 9(b) does not apply to inequitable
conduct because it is neither fraud nor mistake. The Article also
demonstrates that, because inequitable conduct is not literally covered
by Rule 9(b), it is improper to even consider whether public policy
favors applying a heightened pleading standard to inequitable conduct
claims. Even if it were permissible to consider, this Article shows that it
is, at best, a close question as to whether applying Rule 9(b) furthers
public policies, and in fact the application of the Rule to inequitable
conduct is just as likely to frustrate important patent goals as it is to
further them. Next, and contrary to the practice of the district courts,
this Article concludes that Federal Circuit law, and not the law of the
regional circuits, governs what degree of particularity should be
required. Finally, this Article suggests guidelines for applying Rule 9(b)
in the future.2
11. A PRIMER ON INEQUITABLE CONDUCT, NOTICE PLEADING, AND
RULE 9(b)
A. An Overview of the Inequitable Conduct Defense
Breach of the duty of candor to the Patent Office can be an issue
both in the Patent Office and in patent litigation. This section briefly
surveys the role of the courts and the Patent Office in enforcing the duty
of candor.
1. Inequitable Conduct in the Courts
The modern source of the defense of inequitable conduct or fraud
on the Patent Office is the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in Precision
Instrument Manufacturing v. Automotive Maintenance Machine Co.3 Just
a few years later Congress, in the Patent Act of 1952, codified
"unenforceability" as a defense to patent infringement.
2. That is, until the practice is discontinued or in case the Supreme Court decides that it
is I who am wrong. In addition, as noted below, infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text,
Rule 9(b) does apply to claims of actual fraud on the Patent Office. Hence, in those rare
cases seeking affirmative relief and alleging actual fraud on the Office, those guidelines
should be applied.
3. 324 U.S. 806 (1945). See generally Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable
Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37,49-51 (1993).
4. Ch. 950, 66 Stat. 812 (1952) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000)); see
Goldman, supra note 3, at 52-53 (noting the lack of meaningful legislative history).
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Unenforceability includes the defense that the patent was obtained
through inequitable conduct.5
During the time between the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952
and the advent of the Federal Circuit in 1982, courts wildly disagreed on
the precise nature of the defense of fraud on the Patent Office.6 Even
during the tenure of the Federal Circuit, the contours of the defense
have shifted markedly. At one time, the Federal Circuit dramatically
liberalized the defense, and later-equally dramatically-severely
restricted its scope.
As it stands today, inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense to
patent infringement. In order to prove inequitable conduct, the
defendant must prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that there
was material information; (2) which someone substantively involved in
prosecution withheld or misrepresented; (3) with an intent to deceive
the Patent Office (PTO).8 First, information is considered "material
when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would
have considered the information important in deciding whether to allow
the application to issue as a patent."9 Applicants are required to disclose
information to the Patent Office even though the information would
not, by itself, require rejection of a claim."
5. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding
that inequitable conduct "fits best" within section 282(1) of the Patent Act of 1952 as a
grounds for "unenforceability"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).
6. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 52-67 (describing the contradictory and evolving
standards applied by the courts between 1952 and 1982); accord Charles M. McMahon, Intent
to Commit Fraud on the U.S.P.T.O: Is Mere Negligence Once Again Inequitable?, 27 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. Q. J. 49, 55-57 (1999).
7. See Goldman, supra note 3, at 67-84 (describing the Federal Circuit's uneven
development of inequitable conduct elements).
8. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
9. Id. at 1179. The Federal Circuit has applied varied definitions of "materiality," and
has often refused to be bound by any one definition, particularly in the infancy of the court.
In an early decision, the court noted that various definitions of materiality had been used by
courts prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, but stated that "[t]here is no reason... to
be bound by any single standard .... American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc.,
725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
10. Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The court recognized that
requiring disclosure only of facts which would in and of themselves require rejection of the
pending claims, or invalidate them after issuance, was too narrow:
Findings of materiality should not be limited only to those situations where there
can be no dispute that the true facts, or the complete facts, if they had been known,
would most likely have prevented the allowance of the particular claims at issue or
alternatively, would provide a basis for holding those claims invalid. In such cases,
2003]
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The second element focuses on who acted or failed to act. Every
person who is substantively involved in the prosecution of an application
(the "applicant") has a duty to prosecute applications with candor, good
faith, and honesty." Thus, inventors and their attorneys, but not
secretaries or the like, must fulfill the duty of candor.
The third and final element of intent has been given the most wide-
ranging interpretation of the three elements and is also most pertinent
here. During the first six years of the court's existence, some Federal
Circuit panels had suggested that gross negligence was sufficient to find
a patent unenforceable. 2 However, in the late 1980s, the Federal
the claims at issue would probably be invalid, in any event, because of the existence
of those facts, in and of themselves. Whether the claims would also be
unenforceable because a fraud was committed in misrepresenting the facts to the
Patent Office would really be of secondary importance.
Id. Consequently, the Norton court held that information could be material even if it would
not have, from an objective perspective, directly affected patentability of the claims at issue.
Id. Instead, the court held that the subjective views of the examiner and applicant must be
considered, and that if the court determines that "the claims would not have been allowed but
for the misrepresentation, then the facts were material regardless of their effect on the
objective question of patentability." Id.
The broader standard of looking at whether a reasonable examiner would have
considered the information material-as opposed to whether, in light of the information, the
claims are patentable from an objective view point-serves several purposes. The Norton
court emphasized that it served to give "real meaning" to the "relationship of confidence and
trust between applicants and the Patent Office .... " Id. In addition, it reduces search costs,
which is particularly important because, as government employees, examiners have a limited
amount of time to spend on each application. Requiring applicants to submit only
information that they know would result in denial of their claims would thus require
examiners to spend more time on each application.
It bears noting that later developments have undermined the Norton court's statement
that an applicant's withholding of art only invalidates a claim of secondary importance. As
shown more fully below, inequitable conduct with respect to one claim renders the entire
patent-including all other claims, not just the one claim-unenforceable and could lead to
unenforceability of related applications. See infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. In
contrast, invalidity is generally determined on a claim-by-claim basis. See Connell v Sears,
Roebuck Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the validity of each claim
must be determined separately). As a result of these differing consequences, an applicant
that establishes that a claim is invalid does so only for that claim; whereas an applicant who
proves that a patentee intentionally withheld prior art that would have invalidated a claim
renders the entire patent-and perhaps other patents-wholly unenforceable.
11. See Molins, 48 F.3d at 1178.
12. In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878,
884-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Although these cases reasoned that an intent to mislead could be
found based upon gross neglect, the holdings of these courts that a patent could be deemed
unenforceable were consistent with the version of Rule 56 which applied to the patents-in-
suit. At that time, Rule 1.56 provided that an application would be rejected if the "duty of
disclosure was violated through bad faith or gross negligence." Driscoll, 731 F.2d at 884 n. 4
WRONG ABOUT EVERYTHING
Circuit, in a section of Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister
Inc.,"3 which was considered and decided en banc, ostensibly rejected the
proposition that a patent could be held unenforceable if the applicant
had only been grossly negligent in making a misrepresentation or
omission.14 The court then stated:
Some of our opinions have suggested that a finding of gross
negligence compels a finding of intent to deceive. Others have
indicated that gross negligence alone does not mandate a finding
of intent to deceive.
"Gross negligence" has been used as a label for various
patterns of conduct. It is definable, however, only in terms of a
particular act or acts viewed in light of all the circumstances. We
adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to
"gross negligence" does not of itself justify an inference of intent
to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the
evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must
indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to
deceive. 5
While there is room to debate precisely what Kingsdown held, courts
have routinely held that under Kingsdown, proof of gross negligence is
not enough; there must also be proof of intent to mislead the Patent
Office. 6
Even if all three elements are proven, the patent is to be held
unenforceable only if in the equitable judgment of the court "the
conduct of the patentee is so culpable that its patent should not be
enforced." 7 The effect of a finding of inequitable conduct is to render
the affected patent unenforceable in its entirety. Even if the inequitable
conduct pertained only to one claim of a patent (most have more than
(quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(d)); see also Jerabek, 789 F.2d at 890 n.10 (applying rule 56).
13. 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
14. Id.
15. Id. (citations omitted).
16. Compare Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (reasoning that Kingsdown requires a finding of intent to deceive), with McMahon,
supra note 6 (questioning whether negligence is still relevant).
17. La Bounty Mfg., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 958 F.2d 1066, 1070 (Fed. Cir.




one), every claim in the patent is deemed unenforceable.8 Indeed, it is
possible that inequitable conduct during the prosecution of one
application can lead to patents that issued on different, but related,
applications being held unenforceable. 9
2. The Patent Office and the Duty of Candor
Soon after the Supreme Court recognized unenforceability as a
defense in 1945, the Patent Office began requiring applicants to disclose
information material to patentability. This duty was originally
contained in, and is still referred to as, Patent Office "Rule 56," which
was later codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.Y0 For many years, an applicant
who violated Rule 56 could have the application rejected by the Patent
Office even if the invention otherwise met the statutory criteria for
patentability.2' However, in the late 1980s the Patent Office announced
that it would no longer investigate whether applicants had attempted to
deceive it. The Office stated that it was doing so in light of the fact that
the Federal Circuit-apparently in Kingsdown-had imposed "a high
level of proof of intent to mislead...."22 The Patent Office explained:
The Office is not the best forum in which to determine
whether there was an 'intent to mislead', such intent is best
determined when the trier of facts can observe demeanor of
witnesses subjected to cross-examination. The Office is not
presently equipped to handle live testimony. Modifying Office
procedures to do so would not be an effective utilization of
resources. A court, with subpoena power, is presently the best
forum to consider duty of disclosure issues under the present
evidentiary standard for finding an 'intent to mislead.' The court
proceeding involves two parties. This is not the case in the
Office, since even 'protesting' parties are not permitted to
participate under the Rules. Also, it is the courts and not the
Office that are in the best position to fashion an equitable
remedy to fit the precise facts in those cases where inequitable
18. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876.
19. Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
20. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2002). This rule was originally enacted in 1951. See Goldman,
supra note 3, at 53 & n.86.
21. See Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
22. See DONALD S. CHISUM, 4 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.03[4][b][iv] n.66 (1996) (citing




conduct is established. Furthermore, inequitable conduct is not
set by statute as a criteria [sic] for patentability but rather is ajudicial application of the doctrine of unclean hands which is
appropriate to be handled by the courts rather than by an
administrative body. Because of the lack of tools in the Office to
deal with this issue and because of its sensitive nature and
potential impact on a patent, Office determinations generally will
not deter subsequent litigation of the same issue in the courts on
appeal or in separate litigation. Office determinations
significantly add to the expense and time involved in obtaining a
patent with little or no benefit to the patent owner or any other
parties with an interest.23
Soon after making this announcement, the Patent Office formalized
its decision to discontinue investigation of allegations of inequitable
conduct, except in "the most egregious and clear cases," such as when a
court has made a final "decision that inequitable conduct has
occurred. "24
The current, more narrow version of Rule 56 focuses on
patentability of claims and contains a narrow definition of
"materiality. "' Under the current rule, information is material only "if it
establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima
facie case of unpatentability of a claim" or "refutes, or is inconsistent
with, a position the applicant takes in (i) [o]pposing an argument of
unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) [a]sserting an argument of
patentability."
23. Id.
24. Dep't of Commerce, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed.
Reg. 37321, 37323 (Aug. 6, 1991).
25. Id. at 37321.
26. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1-2) (2002). Rule 56 goes on to state:
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information compels a
conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of the evidence,
burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its broadest reasonable
construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given
to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion
of patentability.
Id. at (b)(2). It is unclear whether the Federal Circuit will apply the current more narrow
definition of materiality to inequitable conduct claims. It is certainly not required to do so. It
would be a mistake for it to do so since the reasons for the Patent Office's adoption of a
narrow standard-the lack of resources to enforce a broad standard---do not apply to private
litigants. If it does adopt the narrow definition, however, then the need for enforcement-by
20031
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Thus, the Patent Office currently applies a more narrow definition of
materiality now than in the past. More significant here, it is a matter of
public record that the Patent Office relies on the courts and the accused
infringers to ensure compliance with the duty of candor.
B. The Federal Rules'Approach to Pleading
At common law, disputes were often not decided on the merits, but
rather on whether the plaintiff's pleading complied with what today are
viewed as arcane rules of pleading.27 In rejecting this approach, the
Federal Rules, when adopted in 1938, changed the focus of litigation
from pleadings to the legal or factual merits of the dispute by generally
requiring only notice pleading.28 Pleadings were required to be "simple,
concise, and direct" and "technical forms of pleading" were prohibited.29
Further, courts were required to construe pleadings so "as to do
reason of an inequitable conduct defense-becomes even more critical, since the only
information that would be material would be information that very likely would have reduced
the scope of, or even defeated the issuance of, a claim.
27. As a leading scholar explained:
All claims had to fit within the parameters of any one of ten recognized forms of
action. If a complaint did not sound in one of the recognized forms of action, it was
dismissed. Litigation was characterized by endless rounds of pleading with the goal
of reducing the controversy to one question of law which then could be decided by
the court without trial.... Because trial was disfavored, pleadings were strictly
construed against the drafters. Litigation became a veritable minefield; one
procedural slip and the case would be dismissed with prejudice, irrespective of its
merit. Common law pleading rules honored form over substance and rewarded the
clever advocate over the litigant with the meritorious claims. Justice was achieved
not by obtaining a fair resolution of the dispute but by complying with the arcane
rules of pleading.
Edward Cavanaugh, Pleading Rules in Antitrust Cases: A Return to Fact Pleading?, 21 REV.
LITIG. 1, 3-4 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
28. The principal rule governing pleading emphasizes the short and plain nature of
pleadings:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the
relief the pleader seeks.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (stating that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-
giving.").
29. FED. R. Civ. P. (8)(e) ("Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and
direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.").
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substantial justice. 30  As a result, today's pleadings "play a diminished
role in federal actions compared with their pivotal role at common
law., 31 In typical cases, compliance with the liberal notice provisions of
the Federal Rules is simple and straightfoward.
However, the drafters of the Federal Rules made specific exceptions
to the rule that pleadings must contain only short and plain statements.
The two pertinent exceptions here are both contained in the Rule 9(b)
requirement that "[iun all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity."32 Rule 9(b) provides the only exceptions in the Federal
Rules to notice pleading-fraud and mistake.
The Rule 9(b) exception for fraud in particular was and continues to
be justified on several grounds. First, a claim of fraud impugns the
moral integrity of the accused and does so in the ostensibly public forum
of a federal court pleading. Second, a claim that someone has
committed fraud is viewed as a vague charge.35 Specificity was required
to ensure that the defendant had fair notice of the precise nature of the
claim and thus, adequate notice to defend.36  Third, to the extent a
charge of fraud is being made in order to undo a past transaction or
agreement, requiring specificity would show the "alleged injustice is
severe enough to warrant the risks and difficulties inherent in the re-
examination of old and settled matters," and ostensibly reduces the
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f).
31. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 3.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). The Rule provides in full:
Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice,
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred
generally.
Id. See generally Michael A. Weidinger, Inequitable Pleading: Defendants' Particular Burden
in Patent Infringement Suits, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1178, 1190-91 (1994) (discussing Rule
9(b)).
33. Congress has required particularized pleading in certain securities fraud actions. See
15 U.S.C. § 78 u-4(b)(2) (2000). Rule 9(g) states that certain special damages be specifically
plead. Subsections (a), (c), (d), (e), (f) of Rule 9 are consistent with notice pleading,
generally permitting a generalized pleading of capacity, conditions precedent, performance of
a governmental act, judgment, or time and place, and requiring the party wishing to place
those facts in issue to present a particularized pleading.
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likelihood of a suit being filed solely to discover whether a wrong had, in
fact, been done.37 Finally, the drafters of the Federal Rules believed that
specificity would reduce the likelihood of so-called "strike suits" from
being used to coerce defendants to pay to avoid negative publicity. 8
The particularity requirement also reduces the plaintiff's ability to
create leverage by pleading fraud in a contract action. This may be the
rule's principal functional purpose. Many claims can cause
embarrassment, be used for publicity purposes, be used to undo settled
matters, or be used for discovery.39 Yet, the rules do not require
particularized pleading based on embarrassment and the like. Fraud is
set apart from those claims because it allows for recovery of punitive
damages. Requiring particularized pleading reduces a fraud plaintiff's
settlement leverage.
Whether, in the usual civil case, the goals of the particularity
requirement are in fact met by Rule 9(b) and whether later-developed
rules and procedures obviate the need for it have both been the subject
of considerable writing.40 Whether applying the specificity requirement
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. For example, an allegation of patent infringement need not be made with
particularity. See Weidinger, supra note 32, at 1204. Because many patents contain multiple
claims, and only claims are infringed, a charge of "patent infringement" is quite vague and
hard to defend. In addition, accusations of patent infringement are often widely publicized,
and often require substantial discovery, including discovery into the defendant's
manufacturing processes, research and development programs, and trade secrets. In addition,
patent owners often contend infringement was "willful"--meaning it was done intentionally
or in bad faith. See Read v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Yet, Rule 9(b) does
not apply to claims of infringement. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
40. The current debate over Rule 9(b) was recently summarized as follows:
Whether the specificity in pleading requirement embodied in Rule 9(b)
continues to serve these purposes is a matter of debate. Commentators and courts
have questioned whether the costs imposed by the specificity requirement now
outweigh its benefits. For example, it is not clear whether a specificity requirement
can or should protect reputations. Nor is it clear whether a specificity requirement
provides any meaningful protection against strike suits. Similarly, it does not appear
that particularized pleadings offer any more meaningful notice than ordinary notice
pleadings. Moreover, it is debatable whether a specificity requirement will in fact
provide a solid foundation for opening past transactions that are closed.
In addition, other provisions of the Federal Rules-introduced after the Federal
Rules' initial promulgation-may address concerns that led to the adoption of a
specific standard more effective than Rule 9(b). For example, Rule 11, revitalized in
1983 and fine-tuned in 1993, is specifically targeted at baseless claims and those suits
brought for improper purposes. Strike suits and suits brought solely to obtain
discovery are clearly within the ambit of Rule l's prohibitions.
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of Rule 9(b) to the defense of inequitable conduct serves these purposes
is addressed below.4'
III. RULE 9(b) DOES NOT COVER INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
A long line of district courts have held that Rule 9(b) applies to
inequitable conduct claims.42 One commentator has argued,43 and one
Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 7-8 (footnotes omitted); see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34,
§ 1296 (noting that commentators have questioned the utility of Rule 9(b)).
41. See infra notes 97-153 and accompanying text; see also Weidinger, supra note 32, at
1199-1211 (arguing that Rule 9(b) should not apply to inequitable conduct claims).
42. The earliest decision expressly holding that Rule 9(b) applied to inequitable conduct
claims was Northern Engineering & Plastics Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding Co., 189 U.S.P.Q.
734, 734 (N.D. I11. 1975). There, the court held the defendant's allegation insufficient because
"[n]o specific facts have been pleaded to show fraud. In fact, defendant's pleading gives
plaintiff no notice of what the substance of the alleged fraud was." The Northern Engineering
court concluded that Rule 9(b) applied based upon two decisions: PPG Industries, Inc. v.
Celanese Coatings Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D. Md. 1972), which concluded without analysis
that Rule 9(b) applied and was not met, and Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut
Corp. of America, 158 F. Supp. 277, 278 (D.N.J. 1958), which stated that, even if the claim at
issue was that the trademark had been obtained "fraudulently" as opposed to merely
"falsely," the claim was plead with enough detail to meet Rule 9(b). The Simmonds court did
not address whether Rule 9(b) applied to such claims.
Since that time, numerous courts have held the rule applies. See Point DX, Inc. v. Voxar
Ltd., 2002 WL 31189696, at *1 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2002) ("Like an allegation of fraud, an
allegation of inequitable conduct before the PTO is subject to the enhanced pleading
requirements of Rule 9(b)."); Nortel Networks Ltd. v. Kyocera Wireless Corp., No. 3:02-CV-
0032-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17845, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2002) (applying court's earlier
holding that Rule 9(b) applies); Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 285 (D. Mass. 2002)
("Following the lead of the majority view, this court similarly concludes that Rule 9(b)
applies .... "); Agere Sys. Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734 (D. Del.
2002) ("[A] majority of federal courts have found that allegations of inequitable conduct (i.e.,
fraud before the Patent Office) in patent cases, like other allegations of fraud, are subject to
the requirements of Rule 9(b)."); ASM Am., Inc. v. Genus, Inc., 2002 WL 24444, at *2 (N. D.
Cal. Jan. 9, 2002) (reasoning that "inequitable conduct involve[s] fraud" and so Rule 9(b)
applies); In re Papst Licensing, GMBH Patent Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 446,448 (E.D. La. 2001)
(" [P]ublic policy dictates that the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct is also subject to
the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement."); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139
F. Supp. 2d 348, 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[T]his court finds that claims of inequitable conduct
should be pled with the particularity required by Rule 9(b)."); Union Carbide Chem. &
Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 99-CV-274-SIR, 2000 WL 1481015, at *2 (D. Del.
Sept. 29, 2000) ("The particularity requirement of Rule 9 applies to inequitable conduct
charges."); Rhone-Poulenc Agro S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 537, 538-39 (M.D.N.C.
1999) ("A defense based on a patentee's inequitable conduct is subject to the enhanced
pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) .... ); Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas
PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (S.D. Ind. 1999) ("Averments of fraud on the patent office
must satisfy Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud be pled with particularity."); Systemation, Inc.
v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[Tlhe Court agrees with the clear




district court decision specifically held, that Rule 9(b) does not apply to
inequitable conduct defenses. This section addresses which
interpretation is correct.
A. Rule 9(b) is Strictly Interpreted
Rule 9(b) applies to "all averments of fraud or mistake."44 The
Supreme Court in Leatherman v. Tarran County Narcotics Intelligence
and Coordination Unit45 reversed the broad reading given to the rule by
the Fifth Circuit and held that Rule 9(b) is limited to fraud and
mistake." In Leatherman, the Court addressed whether the Fifth Circuit
had properly applied a "heightened pleading standard" to civil rights
cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4' The Fifth
Circuit held that, rather than merely comply with Rule 8, the complaint
had to "'state with factual detail and particularity the basis for the claim
which necessarily includes why the defendant-official cannot
successfully maintain the defense of immunity.' ,4
Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1101, 1116 (D. Utah. 1996) (court assumed without analysis that Rule 9(b)
applied); Wolf v. Wagner Spray Tech. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1690, 1693 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (court
assumed without analysis that Rule 9(b) applied); Papst Motoren GMBH & Co. KG v.
Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (court assumed Rule
9(b) applied and held some allegations were sufficient); Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Industra Prods.,
Inc., 64 F.R.D. 361, 363 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (court assumes Rule 9(b) applied and held that
pleading met its requirements); see also France Telecom S.A. v. Novell, Inc., No. 102-437-
GMS, 2002 WL 31355255, at *3 (D. Del. Oct. 17, 2002) (assuming Rule 9(b) applied to
unclean hands defense in patent case "[t]o the extent" it involved fraud).
In at least one case, the parties actually agreed that Rule 9(b) applied. Ronald A. Katz
Tech. Licensing L. P. v. Verizon Comm. Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12982 (E.D. Pa. July 16,
2002).
43. Weidinger, supra note 32, at 1196-1211. In addition, Professor Richard Marcus
criticized the application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct as exemplifying courts' efforts to
"strain to justify application of those requirements [of Rule 9(b) of particularity] outside their
natural sphere." Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1749, 1773 (1998) (citing Chiron Corp., 156 F.R.D. at 221).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
45. 507 U.S. 163 (1992).
46. No court has yet addressed how Leatherman affects the application of Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct claims. See infra note 59.
47. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 164.
48. Id. at 167 (quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985)). In Perez, the
Fifth Circuit justified its heightened pleading standard by relying on policy grounds, as
follows:
Where, as here, plaintiffs' complaint alleges in broad, indefinite and conclusory
terms that two government officials, each having the status entitling each to claim
immunity has, in his official capacity, violated plaintiff's rights, the groundwork is
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The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit's imposition of
pleading requirements greater than those required by Rule 8 was
"impossible to square... 'with the liberal system of notice pleading' set
up by the Federal Rules. ,49 It then stated:
Rule 9(b) does impose a particularity requirement in two
specific instances. It provides that "[i]n all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity." Thus, the Federal Rules do address in
Rule 9(b) the question of the need for greater particularity in
pleading certain actions, but do not include among the
enumerated actions any reference to complaints alleging
municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.
... Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims
against municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the
added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result
which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such
an amendment, federal courts and litigants must rely on
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out
laid for disruption of the official's duties, and frustration of the protection and
policies underlying the immunity doctrine.
What is a federal trial judge to do? One thing he may not do: face it as just
another lawsuit in which the notice pleading's liberal policy of F.R.Civ.P. 8 counts
on pretrial discovery to ascertain the factual basis for the claim, and as here, a
defense. Allowing pretrial depositions, especially those taken adversely of the
governmental official to ferret all of his actions and the reasons therefor, either for
the purpose of being able to plead more specifically, or for use in the prospective
trial, would defeat and frustrate the function and purpose of the absolute qualified
immunity ostensibly conferred on the official.
The public goals sought by official immunity are not procedural. Indeed, they
go to very fundamental objectives. To the extent that F.R.Civ.P. 8 and the practices
under it present any conflict, the trial court must find a way to adapt its procedures
to assure full effectuation of this substantive right, since the Enabling Act provides
that the rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
Id. at 1479 (footnotes omitted). Concurring specially, Judge Higginbotham noted that Rule
9(b) applied only to suits involving fraud or mistake, and so doubted that the court had
"authority to add the requirement that claims against officials who enjoy immunity from suit
shall be pled with particularity." Id. at 1483. He reached the same conclusion as the majority,
however, by different means, concluding that "no claim is stated against officials who hold
positions which enjoy absolute immunity absent a statement of sufficient facts which, if true,
would demonstrate the absence of immunity." Id.
49. Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.
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unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."0
The Supreme Court again emphasized the exclusive nature of Rule
9(b) in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,5 where it reviewed the dismissal
of a complaint alleging employment discrimination. 2 The Second Circuit
had held that the plaintiff must plead a prima facie case to avoid
dismissal, and since he had not done so, the court affirmed dismissal of
the complaint. 3 The Supreme Court reversed, explaining:
[I]mposing the Court of Appeals' heightened pleading standard
in employment discrimination cases conflicts with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which provides that a complaint must
include only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief." Such a statement must
simply "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." This simplified
notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and
summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues
and to dispose of unmeritorious claims ....
Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil
actions, with limited exceptions. Rule 9(b), for example,
provides for greater particularity in all averments of fraud or
mistake. This Court, however, has declined to extend such
exceptions to other contexts. In Leatherman we stated: "[T]he
Federal Rules do address in Rule 9(b) the question of the need
for greater particularity in pleading certain actions, but do not
include among the enumerated actions any reference to
50. Id. at 168-69. Two years after Leatherman was announced, Congress passed the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which requires that complaints alleging
securities fraud "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the requisite state of mind," if scienter is an element of the plaintiff's
claim. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000). It also requires that the complaint "specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is
misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information
and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."
§ 78u-(4)(b)(1). Complaints which fail to meet these requirements-which are more strict
than Rule 9(b)-may be dismissed. § 78u-4(b)(3). The Act further provides that discovery is
stayed pending resolution of a motion to dismiss "unless the court finds upon the motion of
any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue
prejudice to that party." § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
51. 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
52. Id. at 508.
53. Id. at 509.
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complaints alleging municipal liability under § 1983. Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius." Just as Rule 9(b) makes no mention
of municipal liability under ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983... neither does
it refer to employment discrimination. Thus, the complaints in
these cases, as in most others, must satisfy only the simple
requirements of Rule 8(a).
In addition to once again giving the rule a strict, literal
interpretation, the Court precluded any judicial inquiry into whether
imposing a heightened pleading requirement would serve significant
policies:
Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on
conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward will
burden the courts and encourage disgruntled employees to bring
unsubstantiated suits. Whatever the practical merits of this
argument, the Federal Rules do no contain a heightened pleading
standard for employment discrimination suits. A requirement of
greater specificity for particular claims is a result that "must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation." Furthermore, Rule 8(a) establishes a
pleading standard without regard to whether a claim will succeed
on the merits.5
While a few courts after Leatherman but before Swierkiewicz saw
room for exceptions and limitations, Swierkiewicz has been seen by
most to remove all doubt: Rule 9(b) is the specific and exclusive
exception in the Federal Rules to the rule that pleadings must only
provide notice, not evidence. 6 As one district court put it, "all civil
actions are governed by Rule 8(a)'s liberal pleading requirement, unless
specifically delineated in Rule 9(b). ""
The Court's strict construction of Rule 9(b) and the dominance of
54. Id. at 512-13 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 514-15 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
56. See In re Bayside Prison Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 755, 763-64 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting the
split that existed after Leatherman concerning propriety of imposing heightened pleading
requirements in certain civil rights cases, but concluding that Swierkiewicz eliminates any
room for such requirement); see also Greenier v. Pace, Local No.1188, 201 F. Supp. 2d 172,
176 (D. Me. 2002) (noting that Swierkiewicz clearly affected prior regional circuit law on
pleading requirements).
57. Bayside, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 764.
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notice pleading are also principles shared by the leading commentators.
For example, Professors Wright and Miller endorse a narrow
construction of Rule 9(b):
By its terms, the particularity requirement in Rule 9(b)
applies only to averments of fraud. Since the rule is a special
pleading requirement and contrary to the general approach of
simplified pleading adopted by the federal rules, its scope of
application should be construed narrowly and not extended to
other legal theories or defenses."
None of these observations regarding the scope of Rule 9(b) has
been applied to the question of whether Rule 9(b) encompasses
inequitable conduct. With these principles firmly in mind, this task will
be embarked upon in the following sections.
B. Claims of Actual Fraud on the Patent Office and Walker Process
Claims are Within Rule 9(b)
It is clear that Rule 9(b) applies to claims of actual fraud committed
on the Patent Office. Consequently, a defendant asserting that a patent
has been obtained through actual fraud on the Patent Office must
comply with Rule 9(b).
A claim that an applicant committed fraud on the Patent Office is
colloquially known as a "Walker Process" claim. 6° The elements of a
Walker Process claim include proof of "independent and clear evidence
of deceptive intent [by an applicant] together with a clear showing of
reliance, i.e., that the patent would not have issued but for the
misrepresentation or omission. "61 Walker Process claims are affirmative
claims for relief, not merely affirmative defenses to patent
infringement.62 The Federal Circuit has equated Walker Process claims
58. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34, § 1297 at 615 (footnotes omitted).
59. Somewhat ironically, one court cited Swierkiewicz in connection with a different
issue while holding that Rule 9(b) applied to inequitable conduct. See Davidson v. Cao, 211
F. Supp. 2d 264,285 (D. Mass. 2002).
60. This name is drawn from the case of Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. &
Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141
F.3d 1059, 1169-70 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining Walker Process fraud).
61. Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1169-70.
62. Id. at 1171.
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with "common law fraud."63 Accordingly, because the elements of the
two are essentially indistinguishable, both are subject to Rule 9(b).'
C. Inequitable Conduct is Not Covered by Rule 9(b)
Rule 9(b) applies to "fraud" and "mistake."65 "Inequitable conduct"
is plainly not mistake,66 and so it falls within Rule 9(b) only if it is fraud.
The following shows, first, that the statutory basis authorizing
inequitable conduct as a defense does not characterize it as fraud.
Second, it shows that, despite loose language in numerous opinions
referring to inequitable conduct as fraud on the Patent Office, it is not
fraud. In fact the Federal Circuit has held that inequitable conduct is
not fraud for every purpose that has arisen.
1. The Statutory Basis for the Argument that Inequitable Conduct is
Not "Fraud"
Section 282 recognizes unenforceability as a defense to patent
infringement.67 Rule 9(b) requires that fraud-not unenforceability-be
plead with particularity. Thus, viewed strictly from the Leatherman
perspective of what Rule 9(b) expressly covers, Rule 9(b) does not apply
to claims of unenforceability."
While this argument appears literalistic, a review of other
intellectual property statutes demonstrates that Congress knew how to
draft statutes permitting fraud as a defense. Most pertinent is that the
Lanham Act authorizes cancellation of trademarks that were
63. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("This
court has previously distinguished 'inequitable conduct' from common law or 'Walker
Process' fraud.").
64. District courts apply Rule 9(b) to Walker Process claims. See, e.g., Miller Pipeline
Corp. v. British Gas PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (S.D. Ind. 1999); see also Horwitt v.
Movado Watch Agency, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 687, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (assuming Rule 9(b)
applied to antitrust claim based upon fraud before the Patent Office); PPG Indus., Inc. v.
Celanese Coatings Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 235 (D. Md. 1972).
65. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
66. Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc v. KLM Labs, Inc., 984 F.2d 1182,1192 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
A good faith mistake by an applicant does not constitute inequitable conduct; instead, there
must be proof of an intent to mislead or deceive the Patent Office. Id. at 1192. Thus,
inequitable conduct is not mistake.
67. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
68. In Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), the Supreme Court reasoned
that "Ujust as Rule 9(b) makes no mention of municipal liability under... 42 U.S.C. §
1983... , neither does it refer to employment discrimination." Id. Neither does Rule 9(b)
refer to 35 U.S.C. § 282, unenforceability, or inequitable conduct.
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fraudulently procured.69 The elements of a claim for fraudulently
procuring a trademark are indistinguishable from common law fraud.7"
Consequently, claims for fraudulently procuring a trademark are subject
to Rule 9(b) because the statute makes fraud a defense.7"
The language used by the Patent Act to authorize unenforceability
as a defense thus stands in stark contrast to the language used by the
Lanham Act to allow cancellation of trademark procured through fraud.
Unenforceability is not fraud, and is therefore not covered by Rule 9(b).
2. Proof of Inequitable Conduct Does Not Require Proof of Fraud
It is "deceptively simple"7" to conclude that inequitable conduct is
within the scope of Rule 9(b) because inequitable conduct has long been
referred to as fraud on the Patent Office," and the cases referring to
inequitable conduct as such are legion." As shown below, however, in
those cases where the Federal Circuit has defined the precise nature of
inequitable conduct, it has recognized that inequitable conduct does not
require proof of fraud in that there is no requirement for proof that the
examiner relied on the misrepresentation or omission. Without this
element, fraud on the Patent Office clearly is not akin to common law
fraud.75
69. Lanham Act § 38, 15 U.S.C. § 1120 (2000). This section provides:
Any person who shall procure registration in the Patent and Trademark Office
of a mark by a false or fraudulent declaration or representation, oral or in writing, or
by any false means, shall be liable in a civil action by any person injured thereby for
any damages sustained in consequence thereof.
Id.; see also Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. v. Mattress Madness, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 1339,
1353 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing claim).
70. Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 841 F. Supp. at 1353 (party asserting fraudulent
procurement must prove "the essential elements of a fraud claim by clear and convincing
evidence.") (listing elements).
71. King Automotive, Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 1010 (C.C.P.A.
1981) ("Rule 9(b) requires that the pleadings contain explicit rather than implied expressions
of the circumstances constituting fraud."); Thomas Indus., Inc. v. L.E. Mason Co., No. 90 C
4099, 1991 WL 83821 (N.D. Ill. May 12, 1991) (holding 9(b) applied to claim for fraudulent
procurement of trademark).
72. Weidinger, supra note 32, at 1197.
73. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
74. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 89.
75. A prior commentator argued that inequitable conduct was not "fraud" because (1)
the elements differed; (2) proof of inequitable conduct does not result in liability, only
unenforceability; (3) "fraud invalidates patent claims, while ... inequitable conduct renders
the entire patent unenforceable;" (4) licensees may have greater rights to receive refunds of
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Foremost, the Federal Circuit has distinguished Walker Process
claims from inequitable conduct on the basis that Walker Process
requires proof of fraud, but inequitable conduct does not.76 Specifically,
in 2000, the Federal Circuit, in In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc.,"
specifically and at length distinguished inequitable conduct from Walker
Process fraud and squarely held that, for purposes of determining
whether inequitable conduct constituted fraud in terms of the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, "'inequitable conduct' is
not by itself common law fraud. " Spalding Sports addressed whether
an accused infringer could pierce the attorney-client privilege being
claimed by the patentee over certain documents due to the crime-fraud
exception. The accused infringer argued that its allegation of
inequitable conduct was sufficient to pierce the privilege; the patentee
contended that to pierce the privilege, the accused infringer had to show
royalties if fraud and not merely inequitable conduct is proven; and (5) judges decide whether
inequitable conduct occurred, while juries typically decide fraud claims. Weidinger, supra
note 32, at 1197-98. The conclusion is correct, but the support is subject to challenge.
The fact that the elements of inequitable conduct differ from fraud is pertinent, since it
suggests inequitable conduct is not fraud. Expressio unius est exclusio alterus.
The fact that inequitable conduct is a defense, and not a claim for money changes, does
not take it outside of Rule 9(b) since claims of fraudulent inducement are covered by Rule
9(b), as are other fraud-based defenses. See Williams v. Nat'l Housing Exchange, Inc., 110 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 699-700 & n.2 (N. D. I11. 2000) (holding defense of fraudulent inducement is
subject to Rule 9(b)) (citing WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34, § 1297 at 616).
The argument that fraud invalidates claims, but inequitable conduct renders patents
unenforceable, is legally incorrect. While inequitable conduct does render patent
unenforceable, J.P. Stevens & Co. v. LexTex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560-61 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (squarely holding that inequitable conduct renders a patent unenforceable), fraud is not
a basis for invalidity of a claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1)-(4) (2000) (limiting defense to
infringement to those stated in certain sections of the Patent Act). As noted above, fraud
may serve as the basis for a Walker Process claim. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Whether or not a third party may have greater rights if a patent is found to have been
obtained through fraud, as opposed to having been procured through inequitable conduct,
merely restates in a different context the proposition that fraud results in potential liability
while inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense. The only case cited, Transition Electronic
Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F. Supp. 885, 892-94 (D. Mass. 1980), affd., 649 F.2d 871
(1st Cir. 1981), held that a licensee may use inequitable conduct as a means to avoid paying
royalties, but must show "Walker Process" type fraud to obtain affirmative relief.
The fact that judges determine whether inequitable conduct has occurred, and juries
typically decide fraud claims, is not probative of whether inequitable conduct is fraud.
76. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069-71 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
77. 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
78. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 807 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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"common law or 'Walker Process' fraud."79
The Federal Circuit recognized that the crime-fraud exception
applied only if "the communication was made 'in furtherance of' a crime
or fraud.' '"' After explaining that it had "previously distinguished
'inequitable conduct' from common law or 'Walker Process' fraud"8' the
court went on to hold that inequitable conduct "in fact is a lesser offense
than common law fraud," and, as such, "is not by itself common law
fraud."82 As a result, pleading inequitable conduct did not plead fraud
in terms of the crime-fraud exception; hence, privilege was upheld.83
In light of the repeated admonitions from the Supreme Court that
the courts are not free to apply heightened pleading standards to claims
other than fraud or mistake-even if public policy demands it-the
Federal Circuit's holding that inequitable conduct is not fraud means
that inequitable conduct necessarily cannot be covered by Rule 9(b).'
79. Id. at 806-07.
80. Id. at 807.
81. Id.
81 Id. The court went on to state:
In the present case, despite the district court's statement that "Wilson has
shown that a material misrepresentation may have been made to the PTO, which
resulted in issuance of the patent at issue," we conclude that Wilson has not made a
prima facie showing that the invention record was made in furtherance of fraud
during the prosecution of the '178 patent. Although the party seeking to overcome
the attorney-client privilege need not conclusively prove fraud, or necessarily submit
direct evidence to make a prima facie showing of fraud, Wilson's mere allegation of
Spalding's failure to cite a reference to the PTO will not suffice. In actuality, a
citation of prior art in an invention record in the absence of evidence of a purpose to
conceal that art would seem to be the opposite of furthering fraud; it informs the
patent attorney or agent of the closest prior art. What the attorney then does with
that information is another matter, but inclusion of the closest prior art in an
invention record does not alone provide evidence of furthering a fraud. Because
Wilson failed to provide any evidence of fraudulent intent, we conclude that the
crime-fraud exception does not apply, and that Spalding's invention record is
protected by the attorney-client privilege.
Id. at 808 (citations omitted). Based upon this passage, one could argue that the actual
holding of the decision is the lack of proof of intent to deceive. However, the court's
emphasis that there must be a prima facie showing of fraud--as opposed to inequitable
conduct-is consistent with the court's repeated statements that a showing of inequitable
conduct was insufficient to constitute fraud for purposes of the crime-fraud exception. Put
simply, after distinguishing fraud from inequitable conduct, and holding that only proof of the
former would satisfy the crime-fraud exception, the court would not have continued to refer
to the need for a prima facie showing of fraud if a showing of inequitable conduct sufficed.
83. Id. at 808.
84. The alternative, of course, is that inequitable conduct could be fraud for purposes of
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Despite this clarity, only the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, in Quantum Corp. v. Western Digital
Corp.," has recognized the distinction between fraud and inequitable
conduct and rejected a patentee's reliance on Rule 9(b) as "misplaced."
The court held that inequitable conduct "does not give rise to the level
of common law fraud which is the subject of Rule 9(b)."86 As shown
above, this distinction was correct-inequitable conduct is not fraud and
is therefore not covered by Rule 9(b). 7
However, every single court to consider the Quantum court's
conclusion, including a judge from the very district that issued the
opinion, has rejected it.8" Courts routinely reject the Quantum holding
on one of three grounds. Some courts reason that because inequitable
conduct has been referred to as fraud on the Patent Office, it must be
fraud in terms of Rule 9(b). 9 Others erroneously hold that inequitable
Rule 9(b) and no other. That conclusion, however, could likely be justified on policy
grounds, an avenue foreclosed by Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and
Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1992).
85. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1712, 1713 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
86. Id. In one other decision, a court concluded that it was "unclear" whether 9(b)
applied. See Scripps Clinic v. Baxter Travenol Lab. Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1562 (D. Del. 1988)
(reasoning that it did not need to decide whether it applied because defendant's pleading met
9(b)); see also Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D.
Ind. 1994) ("[W]ithout engaging in a drawn-out analysis of whether Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)
applies to the issue of inequitable conduct, the court finds that this argument is quibbling; the
defendant has laid out its factual background for both claims.")
87. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
88. See Treatch v. Nextel Comm., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1638, 1639 (D. Ariz. 1999) (noting
that subsequent courts had rejected Quantum); Systemation, Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183
F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998) (questioning vitality of Quantum); Samsung Elec. Co. v. Texas
Instruments Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1675 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (questioning reasoning of
Quantum); Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (noting that the
same judge that decided Quantum had previously held that Rule 9(b) applied to inequitable
conduct claims); Laitram Corp. v. OKI Elec. Indus. Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1527 (E.D. La. 1994)
(rejecting Quantum); Xilinx, Inc. v. Altera Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1149, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(in noting that most courts hold that 9(b) applies, the court criticized Quantum because the
court "did not distinguish, discuss or even recognize its prior holdings to the contrary ....");
IPPV Enterprises v. Cable/Home Comm., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1896 (S.D. Cal. 1992)
(rejecting Quantum).
89. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 285 (D. Mass. 2002) ("[A]n
inequitable conduct claim is markedly similar to a fraud claim."); Agere Sys. Guardian Corp.
v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 726, 734, (D. Del. 2002) (" [A]llegations of inequitable conduct
(i.e., fraud before the Patent Office) in patent cases, like other allegations of fraud, are
subject to the requirements of Rule 9(b)."); ASM Am., Inc. v. Genus, Inc., No. 01-2190 EDL,
2002 WL 24444 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2002) ("Allegations of inequitable conduct involve fraud
and" so Rule 9(b) controls); Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1024
(N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Allegations of inequitable conduct involve fraud and as such are subject to
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conduct requires proof of fraud.9° The third group correctly recognizes
that inequitable conduct does not require proof of fraud, but
nonetheless reason that, since fraudulent conduct could constitute
inequitable conduct, that all claims of inequitable conduct are within
Rule 9(b), even though they do not necessarily require proof of fraud.9
the heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)."); Systemation, Inc. v. Engel
Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[C]ourts have reasoned that Rule 9(b) should
apply since inequitable conduct is a form of fraud."); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Dataram
Corp., No. CIV. 96-20708 SW, 1997 WL 50272, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 1997) ("The defense
of inequitable conduct or 'fraud on the patent office,' falls within the general terms of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b) .... "); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1770,
1775 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Since this allegation is essentially a fraud claim, defendant must plead
this claim with the particularity required under Rule 9(b)."); Samsung Elec. Co. v. Texas
Instruments Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1675 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (reasoning that 9(b) applied
to inequitable conduct claims since "'all averments of fraud"' must be plead with particularity
and "inequitable conduct has been called 'fraud on the patent office."') (quoting Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Heidelberg Harris Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1369, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("claims of fraud,
including claims of inequitable conduct, should be supported by specific allegations .. ");
Chiron, 156 F.R.D. 219, 222 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Rule 9(b) does not, on its face, confine its
commands to common law fraud, but instead encompasses all averments, including, by
definition, inequitable conduct, which has been called 'fraud on the patent office."') (quoting
Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422); Intel Corp. v. Hyundai Elec. Am., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1113, 1115
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that "'fraud on the Patent Office"' is covered by Rule 9(b)).
90. See, e.g., The Wicker Group. v. The Standard Register Co., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1678, 1679
(E.D. Va. 1994) (reasoning that, to show inequitable conduct, fraud must be shown); N. Eng'g
& Plastics Corp. v. Blackhawk Molding Co., 205 U.S.P.Q. 609, 609-10 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(holding that the same level of proof was required for fraud as for inequitable conduct).
91. See, e.g., Laitram, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1533 ("While the defense of 'inequitable
conduct' ... is broader than the defense of 'common law fraud,' ... 'allegations of
"inequitable conduct" ... like other allegations of fraud, are subject to ... Rule 9(b) .... ');
IPPV Enterp. v. Cable/Home Communications, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1896 (S.D. Cal. 1992)
(recognizing distinction between elements of common law fraud and inequitable conduct, and
also the different consequences flowing from such proofs, but then reasoning that
"inequitable conduct is a broader form of common law fraud" and so Rule 9(b) applied);
Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 112 F.R.D. 2, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (after noting that "[f]raud
on the Patent Office is viewed as broader than common law fraud" as it encompassed "both
technical fraud and a wider range of inequitable conduct," the court nonetheless held that
"fraud on the Patent Office" is included within Rule 9(b)).
The court in Scripps Clinic and Research Fund v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 7
U.S.P.Q.2d 1562, 1563 (D. Del. 1988), gave this issue the most extensive analysis stating that
"[w]hile the terms fraud and inequitable conduct are sometimes used synonymously, they are
distinct defenses covering different conduct and leading to different consequences." The
court concluded that fraud was covered by Rule 9(b), but that it was "unclear" whether Rule
9(b) applied to inequitable conduct. Id. The court was correct that fraud and inequitable
conduct are distinct. However, the court incorrectly reached that conclusion by reasoning that
fraud "involves the 'misrepresentation of a material fact' to the PTO, while inequitable
conduct involves the omission of a material fact, as well as the misrepresentation of
information." Id. (quoting J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed.
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The first two lines of reasoning are incorrect in that inequitable
conduct does not require proof of fraud, as shown above. The third line
of reasoning also fails: merely because a defendant might allege fraud
does not mean that, when he has not done so, he still must meet Rule
9(b). If the defendant has pleaded only inequitable conduct, and not
common law or Walker Process fraud, he cannot be subject to Rule
9(b).92
The same distinction-as fine as it is-is made under Rule 9(b) in
analogous contexts. For example, where a plaintiff pleads breach of
fiduciary duty,93 Rule 9(b) is not implicated; however, where he pleads
Cir. 1984)). The J.P. Stevens court did not suggest that omission and commission
distinguished inequitable conduct and fraud, and in fact inequitable conduct can occur
through either omission or commission. See supra notes 5, 75.
The Scripps court also erroneously stated that the consequences of "fraud leads to patent
invalidity, while a charge of inequitable conduct leads to patent unenforceability." Scripps, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1563 (citing 2 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 15.08 at 15-
126 (2d ed. 1987)). As shown above, the consequences of committing common law fraud are
unenforceability and, if the other elements are proven, affirmative relief is in the form of a
Walker Process antitrust claim-the consequence of inequitable conduct is unenforceability.
See supra note 75 and accompanying text; IPPV, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1896 (explaining different
consequences of fraud and inequitable conduct).
92. The distinctions between Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct are many.
The elements differ. See supra notes 60-64, 76-79 and accompanying text. The consequences
also differ: a Walker Process claim is an affirmative claim for money damages-automatically
trebled under the antitrust laws-while a holding of inequitable conduct merely renders the
patent unenforceable. The only affirmative relief an inequitable conduct defense can bring is
an injunction against enforcement of the patent and, in "exceptional cases," possibly an award
of attorneys' fees. See Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Tech., Ltd., 63
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Because an award of attorneys fees is also available where
invalidity is proven in an "exceptional case," Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Serv. Inc., 290
F.3d 1364, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The only difference between the consequences of
invalidity and unenforceability is that invalidity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis while
inequitable conduct renders the entire patent (and, potentially, related patents)
unenforceable. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
93. Courts have regularly described the obligations that an attorney owes to the Patent
Office as involving the "'highest standards of honesty and candor on the part of
applicants....' Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting
Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). The Supreme Court in its only decision
discussing the doctrine, Precision Instrument, stated that applicants "have an uncompromising
duty to report to [the Patent Office] all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness
underlying the applications at issue." Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945).
No doubt as a result of such formulations of the duty, several courts have held or stated
that an applicant owes the Patent Office "a fiduciary-like duty." Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d
779,795 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Avco Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 84, 89 (D. Mass. 1994)
(describing relationship between applicants and Patent Office as involving "confidence and
trust" and concluding that the duty was "one of utmost candor, akin to that of a fiduciary
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that the breach of fiduciary duty was done fraudulently, then Rule 9(b)
applies.94 Likewise, only where a claim under Section 11 or the
Securities Act of 1933" "sounds in fraud" or has "fraud at its core" must
it be pleaded in compliance with Rule 9(b).96
In light of the distinction between fraud and inequitable conduct, a
defendant who pleads the affirmative defense of inequitable conduct
must only comply with Rule 8. If the defendant seeks affirmative relief
and alleges that the conduct was fraudulent in terms of the common law
or Walker Process, then it must be pleaded with particularity under Rule
9(b).
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz foreclose inquiry into whether public
policy would be best served by requiring inequitable conduct to be
pleaded in accordance with Rule 9(b). Inequitable conduct is not fraud
or mistake, so it is not covered.
duty.").
94. See Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding Rule 8, not
9(b), applied to breach of fiduciary duty claims); Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1503 (9th
Cir. 1995) (explaining basis for applying Rule 9(b) to fraudulent but not innocent breach of
fiduciary duty claims); Official Comm. of UnseCured Creditors v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. CIV. 8688, 2002 WL 362794, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. March 6, 2002)
(reasoning that Rule 9(b) did not require pleading of breach of fiduciary duty claim with
particularity since the defendant "may be found to have breached its fiduciary duty.., by
conduct not amounting to fraud, such as by breaching its duties of care, disclosure, and
loyalty."); Sheldon v. Vermonty, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (D. Kan. 1998) ("A plaintiff
pleading a claim for breach of fiduciary duty need only comply with Rule 8 (notice pleading),
not Rule 9(b), because this claim is not based on fraud."); Shapiro v. Miami Oil Producers,
Inc., 84 F.R.D. 234, 236 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that Rule 9(b) "does not extend to
allegations of breach of duty, whether or not characterized as fiduciary, by conduct not
amounting to fraud or mistake."). However, "a claim for breach of fiduciary duty must be
pled with particularity where the alleged breach itself is a scheme to defraud." Precision
Vascular Sys., Inc. v. Sarcos L.C., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1181,1191 (D. Utah 2002).
Like a non-fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty, proof of inequitable conduct does not
require proof of fraud. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text. Thus, inequitable
conduct is outside the scope of Rule 9(b) for the same reason that non-fraudulent claims for
breach of fiduciary duty are. Conversely, where the same conduct-whether it be breach of
fiduciary duty or breach of Rule 1.56-is done fraudulently, then Rule 9(b) applies.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
96. In re Stac Elecs. Sec. Litig., 89 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rule 9(b) applies
to Section 11 claims that sound in fraud); Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.6 (5th. Cir.
1994) (Rule 9(b) applies when Section 11 claim is "grounded in fraud rather than
negligence"); Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 288 (3d Cir. 1992) (Rule 9(b) only
applies to Section 11 claims it "grounded" in fraud). When a Section 11 claim does not allege
fraud, it cannot be dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 9(b). Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club
v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2001).
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IV. THE CLOSE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PURPOSE AND POLICIES
OF RULE 9(b) ARE SERVED BY ITS APPLICATION TO INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
Even assuming Leatherman, Swierkiewicz, and Spalding do not
preclude application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims, it is at
best a close question as to whether the policies served by Rule 9(b) are
furthered by applying it to inequitable conduct claims. Those policies
are generally stated to include: (1) requiring greater pre-suit
investigation of fraud claims because of the harm that publicly airing
charges can cause;' (2) providing notice to the defendant of the nature
of the claim; (3) setting parameters for the scope of discovery and
relevance at trial; and (4) providing a mechanism for disposition on the
merits." These same concerns, as well as the need to avoid
disqualification of trial counsel for the patentee-who may be witnesses
with respect to the inequitable conduct claim if they prosecuted the
patent 9 -have been cited by trial courts as justifying the application of
97. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Northwestern Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 172 F.3d 467, 469 (7th Cir.
1999). The court held:
Greater precomplaint investigation is warranted in fraud cases because public
charges of fraud can do great harm to the reputation of a business firm or other
enterprise (or individual), because fraud is frequently charged irresponsibly by
people who have suffered a loss and want to find someone to blame for it, and
because charges of fraud (and mistake, the other charge that Rule 9(b) requires be
pleaded with particularity) frequently. asks courts in effect to rewrite the parties'
contract or otherwise disrupt established relationships.
Id.
98. Marcus, supra note 43, at 1755-56. Professor Marcus believes that the only purpose
actually served by Rule 9(b) is to dispose of cases on the merits, and that even that narrow
purpose justifies having the rule:
Although possible in only a small percentage of cases, merits disposition provides a
principal reason for retaining pleading motions in the scheme of the rules. And it
should not be thought that pleading motions further this goal only when they lead to
a complete dismissal. A motion to dismiss that whittles a complaint with twenty
claims down to two viable claims has not been a failure in terms of merits
disposition.
Id. at 1756 (footnotes omitted). Others have stated that the only "defensible" purpose of
Rule 9(b) is "to force the plaintiff to do more than the usual investigation before filing his
complaint." Ackerman, 172 F.3d at 469; see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34, § 1296
(questioning utility of Rule 9(b)). "Whether the specificity in pleading requirement
embodied in Rule 9(b) continues to serve these purposes is a matter of debate." Cavanaugh,
supra note 27, at 7.
99. See Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 156 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct. This section shows that these
concerns present close questions and that countervailing public policies
implicated by the patent system warrant applying Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct claims very leniently, if at all.
A. Application of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct Claims Does Not
Further Public Policies
At the outset, no court has confronted the central distinction
between the typical fraud case and inequitable conduct-that the typical
fraud plaintiff engaged in some sort of transaction with the defendant.
As a result, the fraud plaintiff should have little difficulty in explaining
how he was defrauded and seldom need discover the facts showing when
and how fraud was accomplished.'0° The accused infringer is in a far
different circumstance. The accused infringer often will have never
dealt with the patentee before the filing of suit. More fundamentally,
the fraud about which he is complaining happened to a third party-the
Patent Office. The accused infringer is a stranger to the fraud. This
distinction between inequitable conduct and fraud-overlooked by the
courts-means that inequitable conduct is outside the fraud paradigm of
the typical Rule 9(b) case. As next shown, this distinction also means
that, whether or not Rule 9(b) furthers public policy in the typical fraud
case, it potentially frustrates equally important public policies unique to
the patent system.
1. Applying Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct Claims Will Not Increase
Pre-Suit Inquiry Because Inequitable Conduct is a Defense, Not an
Affirmative Claim for Relief
A heightened pleading requirement has been justified on the basis
that it requires plaintiffs to investigate their suit more thoroughly prior
to filing a claim for fraud.' ' Put another way, some say that Rule 9(b)
100. Even so, some courts have applauded the use of interrogatories by parties accused
of fraud to determine the specifics when a pleading is insufficient, recognizing that using a
contention interrogatory to ascertain the specifics both protects the party by eliminating "the
potential prejudice or surprise to the party responding to the fraud claim that might arise
from the insertion at some point in the litigation of unexpected and unpleaded allegations of
misrepresentations," and also saves the courts and litigants time spent on litigating "the
adequacy of the... pleading of fraud and the ... attempt to replead the claim with the
requisite particularity." Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1071,
1099-1100 (N.D. Iowa 2001). Such an approach also keeps the details of the allegation from
becoming public.
101. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 7.
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will deter "actions filed solely to obtain discovery" regarding whether a
fraud occurred."2 Applying this general justification for the rule to the
context of inequitable conduct, courts have reasoned that it is necessary
to apply Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims because "[v]ague
allegations of inequitable conduct may also be the launching of a 'fishing
expedition,' allowing the accuser to embark on wide-ranging discovery
upon a thimble-full of facts."° 3
Clearly, where the accused infringer brings a declaratory judgment
action, applying Rule 9(b) will preclude filing suits in order to conduct
discovery. In the declaratory judgment context, one court properly
reasoned that applying Rule 9(b) "prevents the filing of a complaint as a
pretext for the discovery of unknown wrongs.""'4 Accordingly, it held
that the plaintiff had improperly pleaded inequitable conduct, since the
accused infringer could only state that "discovery may serve to elucidate
and bolster its pleadings."'0 5 In that procedural context, the court
correctly reasoned that a "general allegation of inequitable conduct
should not be used as a launching pad for extensive or unwarranted
discovery, and holding [p]laintiff[s] to the strictures of Rule 9(b) may
assist in discouraging that practice. "1"
In the more typical patent case, however, the accused infringer is a
defendant. The defendant typically will have had little warning that it
was allegedly infringing a patent and will not be in a position to have
done much, if any, pre-suit discovery. Further, even if the soon-to-be-
defendant had some warning of potential infringement and so could
have obtained the prosecution history of the patent, it will have had the
opportunity only to locate in the prosecution history affirmative
misrepresentations concerning the scope or content of public
information.' °7 But any pre-suit investigation will, by reason of the
102. Id.
103. Chiron Corp., 156 F.R.D. at 222; accord Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1369, 1372 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (stating in dicta that applying
Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims "constrains the utilization of such claims to redressing
wrongs committed, rather than to uncovering wrongs merely suspected."); Optical Coating
Lab., Inc. v. Applied Vision, Ltd., No. C-92-4689 MHP, 1995 WL 150513, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 20, 1995).




107. An examination of the prosecution history-which is the administrative record
from the Patent Office-may reveal, for example, whether the applicant made statements
[86:895
WRONG ABOUT EVERYTHING
nature of patent prosecution, be incomplete. For example, the
defendant will have had no opportunity to investigate omissions, such as
whether the applicants knew but failed to disclose material information
to the Patent Office. For these reasons, even if a pre-suit investigation is
possible, it will be incomplete. In many instances, at the outset of the
suit the accused infringer will have at most a thimble-full of facts and the
need to discover whether the full facts reveal misconduct.
Thus, the argument that 9(b) must apply to inequitable conduct in
order to forestall needless discovery fails to take into account the fact
that inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense. Further, the details
of the defense are found only in communications to which the defendant
can never have had full, pre-suit access. Unlike the typical fraud
plaintiff who was the victim of the fraud, the accused infringer must
have discovery to determine whether a third party-the Patent
Office--has been deceived. For these reasons, application of Rule 9(b)
to inequitable conduct claims cannot be justified by stating that doing so
will increase pre-suit investigation. In many cases, pre-suit investigation
is not possible; and where it is possible, it is usually only partially
available.
Ignoring these fundamental differences, however, courts have
wrongly held with respect to inequitable conduct defenses that "it is
improper to use discovery in search of a factual predicate required to be
pleaded in the first instance."'"" The same courts wrongly denied
motions to compel discovery designed to determine whether factual
bases for inequitable conduct claims exist.1' Either approach-if used
about prior art or otherwise publically available information. If so, then the accused infringer
can obtain and review that prior art or other information to compare against the
representations made to the Patent Office to determine if a misrepresentation had been
made. Review of the prosecution history cannot, however, show whether the applicant
misrepresented information known only to the applicant, such as internal testing, or whether
there had been prior sales. It also cannot show that the applicant knew of other public
information, but failed to disclose it to the Patent Office.
108. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (collecting
cases), aff'd, 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
109. Id.
[A]bsent any indication that there is even a modicum of substance to Arco's
hypothesis... [that inequitable conduct occurred], Arco's "need" for the requested
discovery is reduced to its desire to uncover a factual predicate for its facially




to preclude discovery into whether inequitable conduct
occurred-creates practical difficulties for defendants and ignores the
fact that a defendant cannot fully determine whether inequitable
conduct occurred without taking discovery. It also deprives the only
party with the statutory right to raise the defense from conducting
discovery into it.
For these reasons, while it is true that applying Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct will eliminate the ability of defendants to use the
defense to discover whether inequitable conduct has occurred, the
nature of inequitable conduct means that a defendant by definition
cannot plead it, fully, without discovery. The Patent Office's need for
litigants to enforce the duty of candor in Rule 1.56 can in these ways
actually be frustrated by applying Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct.
2. Applying Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct May Decrease Its Use,
but at a Cost to the Public
Some courts apply Rule 9(b) using the related justification that
requiring a plaintiff to plead fraud with particularity protects
reputations from public charges of moral turpitude.10 In justifying
application of Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims, the courts have
concluded that allowing "unfounded allegations of fraud" harms, not
just the "integrity of reputable attorneys," but also of the "bar in toto,"
as well as "respectable clients, eminent experts, and honest patent
examiners . . . .""' These courts reason that the judicial system itself has
"a strong interest in weeding out allegations of inequitable conduct
asserted in bad faith." ' In this vein, numerous courts"' have relied
upon the following passage from the Federal Circuit to support applying
110. In re Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1460,1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
111. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219,222 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
112. Id. at 223.
113. See, e.g., Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 285 (D. Mass. 2002); Systemation,
Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998); Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Texas
Instruments Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1673, 1675 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Optical Coating Lab., Inc. v.
Applied Vision Ltd., No. C-92-4689 HHP, 1995 WL 150513, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995);
Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 782, 784 (N.D. Ind. 1994);
Chiron Corp., 156 F.R.D. at 221; IPPV Enterp. v. Cable/Home Communications, 25
U.S.P.Q.2d 1894, 1895 (S.D. Cal. 1993); see also Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy
Indus., Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1369, 1372 (N.D. I11. 1996) (stating in dicta that applying 9(b)
"prevents claims of fraud from being used to impugn the integrity of attorneys involved in
patent prosecutions without sufficient evidence that wrongdoing has in fact occurred .... ).
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Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct because doing so furthers important
public policy of avoiding embarrassment:
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every
major patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable
lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other
reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their
client's interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with
the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but such
charges are not inconsequential on that account. They destroy
the respect for one another's integrity, for being fellow members
of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable
help to the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases,
and to sustain the good name of the bar itself. A patent litigant
should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge of
"inequitable conduct in the Patent Office" is a negative
contribution to the rightful administration of justice. The charge
was formerly known as 'fraud on the Patent Office,' a more
pejorative term, but the change of name does not make the thing
itself smell any sweeter."'
Even assuming that preventing the humiliation is a proper concern
of the courts"' and assuming further that the countervailing interest of
the public in exposing unenforceable patents does not simply outweigh
the patentee's interest in avoiding public embarrassment,"' this concern
seems both exaggerated and misplaced. At the outset, the Federal
Circuit took a major substantive step toward eradicating this plague the
same year it was diagnosed, when the court made it clear that proof of
gross negligence was insufficient to support a finding of inequitable
conduct. The change, from gross neglect to a requirement of intent to
deceive, 'no doubt reduced the number of claims. Second, as shown
below, inequitable conduct has in recent years been pleaded in roughly
114. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418,1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
115. Seesupra note 40.
116. As noted above, the Patent Office no longer investigates whether material
information was withheld with an intent to deceive. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text. The public's interest in ensuring patents are not granted based upon misrepresentation
must be weighed against a patentee's embarrassment at being accused of misconduct. Id.
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Under Rule 11, of course, a defendant
can plead inequitable conduct only if it has "evidentiary support." FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
Necessarily, the change from gross neglect to intent to deceive means that inequitable
conduct can properly be plead in narrower circumstances.
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one of five cases, and has been successful in roughly one of five cases
where it has been plead."' What little empirical evidence there is
indicates that the success rate of inequitable conduct defenses is not
significantly different than for other defenses,"9 which suggests that
inequitable conduct is no more a plague than are claims of invalidity.
Putting that to the side, and even assuming the plague is still
sufficiently widespread to be in need of an antidote, application of Rule
9(b) is at best a placebo, not a cure. First, the notion that a patent
examiner's reputation is harmed by an allegation that a patent applicant
deceived her seems incongruous. 20 If anything, patent examiners have
an interest in ensuring that any deception practiced upon them is
brought to light and punished. Indeed, because the Patent Office does
not investigate whether information was withheld intentionally,'
private litigants are the only parties with the right and resources to
enforce the duty of candor. The only party who can help the Office
ensure that the duty of candor is met is the accused infringer.
Honest attorneys and clients are impugned, however, when a false
assertion of inequitable conduct is made. Rather than protecting their
reputations from public tarnishment, however, applying Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct claims will result in precisely the opposite: if Rule
9(b) does not apply, the details of any misconduct will be pleaded only
in response to interrogatory answers; if Rule 9(b) applies, then the
details will be aired in public pleadings. Thus, the reputations of those
people who are harmed by truly baseless assertions of inequitable
conduct would probably be better protected if the details of such claims
were not made in pleadings.
For these reasons, and to the extent that concern of the courts over
"public humiliation" is a legitimate concern that is not, in any event,
outweighed by the compelling need to identify patents obtained through
deception, applying Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct will not reduce
public humiliation and instead may exacerbate it.ln
118. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
119. See id.
120. Likewise, experts (as such) are not impugned by assertions of inequitable conduct.
An expert retained by a patentee accused of inequitable conduct faces no personal taint.
121. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
122. Even assuming otherwise, to the extent empirical evidence exists, there is no plague
that requires application of Rule 9(b). See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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3. Applying Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct Will Provide Notice, but
So Will Applying it to Any Defense
The courts have justified applying Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct
cases by pointing to the fact that it supplies the plaintiff with notice of
the claims against her."l It is axiomatic that the more detail a defendant
is required to provide, the easier it will be for the plaintiff to respond.
Yet, the Federal Rules rejected detailed pleading, opting instead for
notice pleading. Indeed, at the time the Rules were adopted, an effort
to require patentees to plead infringement with particularity was
rejected." Consequently, the fact that a detailed pleading provides
more notice than required by Rule 8 cannot, by itself, justify being
included in Rule 9(b); otherwise, all pleadings would be covered by
Rule 9(b).
Moreover, a defendant claiming inequitable conduct is not in a
position, at least in its original answer, to provide notice to the plaintiff
of the details concerning inequitable conduct. As shown above,"5 only
by taking discovery of the applicants can the defendant completely
discover whether material information was withheld or a
misrepresentation made. A defendant cannot give notice of what it does
not know. 6 Thus, while applying Rule 9(b) to typical fraud claims does
123. Weidinger, supra note 32, at 1202-03. Justifications for applying Rule 9(b) to other
types of suits are simply not relevant to patent suits. For example, requiring a securities fraud
plaintiff to plead fraud with particularity is justified by the belief that it reduces strike suits.
Id. Inequitable conduct-which is only an affirmative defense, not a claim for relief-is not
going to be raised in a "strike suit" designed to extort money from the patentee.
124. See id. at 1204. A charge of infringement-particularly willful infringement-is just
as likely to tarnish reputations and cause unnecessary costs as is a charge of willful
infringement. Yet, the patentee is required to plead only notice of infringement; the details
of infringement-complicated as they often are, involving claim charts and battles of
lexicographers and experts-are left to discovery.
125. See supra notes 101-09 and accompanying text.
126. Defendants are required to provide particularized notice, either in their pleadings
or otherwise:
In actions involving the validity or infringement of a patent the party asserting
invalidity or noninfringement shall give notice in the pleadings or otherwise in
writing to the adverse party at least thirty days before the trial, of the country,
number, date, and name of the patentee of any patent, the title, date, and page
numbers of any publication to be relied upon as anticipation of the patent in suit or,
except in actions in the United States Court of Federal Claims, as showing the state
of the art, and the name and address of any person who may be relied upon as the
prior inventor or as having prior knowledge of or as having previously used or
offered for sale the invention of the patent in suit. In the absence of such notice
20031
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [86:895
serve a notice function, and likewise does so when it is applied to
inequitable conduct, the same can be true of any claim or defense.
Because of the practical distinction between inequitable conduct and
typical fraud, it is unsatisfactory and hollow to justify the application of
Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims, at least with respect to the
defendant's original answer," in order to serve a notice function.
4. Applying Rule 9(b) Will Not Significantly Define or Limit the Scope
of Discovery
Courts have stated that "[d]efending against an allegation of
inequitable conduct can consume enormous resources, particularly if the
allegation fails to pinpoint the precise offending conduct."'28 No
empirical research addresses this issue. However, on its face, it is
inaccurate because it fails to take into account the nature of patent
litigation.
proof of the said matters may not be made at the trial except on such terms as the
court requires.
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2002). One commentator argues that the notice that defendants are required
by Section 282 to provide gives sufficient notice to patentees, and as such, Rule 9(b) should
not apply at all. Weidinger, supra note 32, at 1204 (contending that Section 282 "ensures that
plaintiffs will be afforded the information they need to refute a defense of inequitable
conduct").
Section 282 does not provide adequate notice to the patentee of the details of a defense
of unenforceability. First, Section 282 would not even apply where the only issue is
enforceability of the patent-in-suit, since Section 282 applies to invalidity only. Second,
notice must be given thirty days before trial, and in my experience, that is precisely when it is
given. A patent owner can hardly prepare a case for trial with only thirty days notice. Third,
it requires disclosure only of a very narrow swath of the type of evidence that can be relevant
to an inequitable conduct defense, in essence requiring disclosure only of (1) printed
publications that allegedly anticipate or render obvious a claim and (2) the identity of any
person who previously invented the claimed invention. Thus, it would not require the
defendant to identify prior uses by the defendant of the claimed invention, nor test data
withheld from or misrepresented to the Patent Office. The existence of Section 282 is
irrelevant to whether Rule 9(b) should apply.
127. Requiring a defendant who uncovers during discovery facts showing inequitable
conduct to plead those facts-as opposed to merely providing them in response to a
contention interrogatory-places form over substance with respect to the notice function. A
defendant has as much notice of the particulars of the defense if they are laid out in an
interrogatory response as he does if they are plead in an answer as an affirmative defense.
While Rule 11 only applies to pleadings, not discovery, a discovery response alleging
inequitable conduct is held to essentially the same standards. Compare FED. R. CIV. P.
26(g)(2) (reasonable inquiry required), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (reasonable inquiry
required). Requiring that the details of the allegation be plead, rather than included in an
interrogatory answer, is not likely to affect the ability of patentees to sanction violations.
128. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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While it may be true in typical civil cases that the naked accusation
that a defendant defrauded a plaintiff can lead to open-ended and
expensive discovery, the addition of an inequitable conduct claim to the
typical patent case will not expand the scope of discovery, or of trial,
very much. Unlike the usual fraud case, the scope of discovery for
determining whether inequitable conduct occurred is necessarily limited
by reason of the limited nature of the duty to disclose.
First, even though corporations own most patents,29 the knowledge
of only a very few people matters. Only the knowledge of those persons
substantively involved in prosecution-typically the inventors and their
attorneys or patent agents--counts for purposes of determining whether
inequitable conduct occurred. 3 ' Hence, wide-ranging forays into what
other corporate employees knew or did not know are usually
unnecessary because what they knew is not relevant. 3' Second, the
scope of what is material is limited by the scope of the claims of the
patent. Information that is not relevant to the claims cannot be material
information.'32 Third, patents typically issue within two to three years,
and the recent amendments eliminate most incentive to delay. " The
comparatively short time that most patents pend before the Office,
therefore, temporally limits the scope of relevant information. What an
applicant learned after the patent had issued is irrelevant.
Fourth, because most patent cases include invalidity defenses, the
scope of discovery will not be significantly expanded by the inclusion of
129. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2101 (2000); accord John R.
Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82
B.U. L. REV. 77, 97-98 (2002) (also noting that in 1976, nearly three-fourths of inventors also
assigned their inventions to corporations).
130. See David Hricik, The Risks and Responsibilities of Attorneys and Firms
Prosecuting Patents for Different Clients in Related Technologies, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
331, 348-51 (2000) (showing that principles of imputed knowledge do not apply to inequitable
conduct claims). But cf. Brasseler, U.S.A. 1, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) (imputing lawyer's legal knowledge to applicants).
131. Under unusual facts, what persons not substantively involved in prosecution of the
patent may know can be important. In particular, where someone involved in prosecution is
put on notice that another person possesses material information, there may be a duty to
investigate. See Hricik, supra note 130, at 348-51; Brasseler, 267 F.3d at 1376. Under such
circumstances, what others knew may be important.
132. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
133. Under prior law, patents expired seventeen years after issuance. Today, they expire
twenty years after filing. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir.




an inequitable conduct defense. All of the information that was
submitted to the Patent Office, and what was not provided, will be fully
explored during discovery. For example, because it is easier to establish
invalidity based upon art that was not disclosed to the Patent Office,'
an accused infringer will undertake expensive and wide-ranging
discovery to identify prior art that was not disclosed to the Patent
Office. Inventors will always be deposed, and asking the inventor if he
had known of the uncited prior art adds little expense.'35 Similarly, a
defendant usually demands the production of every lab notebook
related to the invention, as well as all test data either submitted to the
Patent Office or run during the same time period, to ascertain whether
the test data actually shows the invention works as claimed. Again,
asking a few questions of the two or three witnesses who typically are
substantively involved in the prosecution of the application why certain
tests were withheld, or why results were ostensibly "cherry-picked,"
adds little time or expense to most patent cases.
Adding inequitable conduct to a patent case will add some areas of
inquiry, but it usually will not add a great number of new issues nor, in
the usual case, more than one new witness-the attorney or patent agent
who prosecuted the application.'36 Finally, but perhaps most
fundamentally, an accused infringer is by statute entitled to determine
whether the patent is unenforceable.'37 Indeed, the accused infringer is
the only party with incentive and the means to determine whether the
patent was obtained through deception.3 ' It is curious at best to use the
cost of discovery as a reason to apply Rule 9(b) when the Patent Office
stopped investigating claims of inequitable conduct and left it to private
litigants because they have the resources to investigate.
For all these reasons, determining whether inequitable conduct
occurred will require discovery as to whether or not Rule 9(b) applies.
134. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 837 F.2d 1044, 1050-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
135. For example, a defendant who raises the defense of obviousness-a common
defense-will want to discover what the state of the art was, what persons skilled in the art
knew, and similar evidence. Inquiry into those areas overlaps substantially with evidence of
inequitable conduct. If, for example, the defendant learns that the inventor knew of a similar
device, but failed to disclose it, the similarity of the devices will be evidence of obviousness,
and the failure to disclose it, evidence of inequitable conduct.
136. See also infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text. The knowledge of the
inventor's attorney "counts," for inequitable conduct purposes, and his duty of disclosure is
independent of his client's. See Hricik, supra note 130, at 332-34.
137. See supra note 4.
138. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, allowing a defendant to plead inequitable conduct without
complying with Rule 9(b) does not mean that discovery will be
increased.'39
5. Applying Rule 9(b) to Inequitable Conduct Will Not Reduce
Attorney Disqualification
District courts have reasoned that assertions of inequitable conduct
can be used to disqualify counsel, believing that "if the attorneys
representing the party accused of inequitable conduct are the same
attorneys who represented the client in the patent prosecution, then the
party asserting inequitable conduct will often move to disqualify those
attorneys."'40 In jurisdictions that follow the majority interpretation of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, this concern is
overstated.
4 1
First, even if the prosecuting attorneys were witnesses at trial, only
the attorneys who personally prosecuted the patent would be
disqualified-not other members of their firm.14 Due to specialization
of attorneys, it will seldom be the case that an attorney who prosecuted
the patent-in-suit also serves as trial counsel. In my experience, that has
never occurred.
Second, even those attorneys who were personally involved in
prosecution are disqualified only from actually appearing before the
jury at trial.1'3 The only disqualification that most courts now impose on
139. Requiring the defendant to comply with the Rule by pleading the facts, rather than
stating them in response to discovery, seems a hollow requirement. Notice is notice.
140. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219, 222 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see also Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Dataram Corp., No. CIV 96-20708 SW, 1997 WL 50272, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 4, 1997) (citing "inherent dangers" of inequitable conduct defense as including "attorney
disqualification).
141. As shown in this section, the ABA and lending authorities have interpreted the
lawyer-witness rule in ways that limit its scope. Obviously, exceptions exist. A
comprehensive review of the lawyer-witness rule is beyond the scope of this section. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 108 (2000).
142. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (1983). Only if there is a conflict
under Model Rules 1.7 or 1.9 are members of the testifying attorney's firm disqualified. Id.;
see also Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (firm-wide disqualification is
"extremely harsh" and should be limited); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 108, cmt. i (A lawyer affiliated with the disqualified lawyer "may serve as
advocate.. . so long as the representation would not involve in conflict of interest. .. ").
143. When Model Rule 3.7(a) disqualifies a lawyer-witness, it does so only from
"act[ing] as an advocate at a trial." See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility,
Informal Op. 89-1529 (1989) (lawyer may conduct pre-trial proceedings); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility Informal Op. 83-1503 (1983) (lawyer may handle
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lawyers who are disqualified under the lawyer-witness rule is that such
lawyers may not serve as trial counsel. Even then, the proscription
exists only where trial is to the jury. Accordingly, even a disqualified
lawyer would be free to conduct discovery, argue dispositive motions,
control and direct the lawsuit, and handle any appeal. Moreover,
assuming participation at trial by a lawyer who had prosecuted the
patent was critical, inequitable conduct presents no jury issues.1' Under
those circumstances, a separate trial to the judge alone-where the
lawyer-witness may ethically testify-may be used to obviate any ethical
issues.'45
Finally, even in those few cases where the prosecuting attorney is
also trial counsel and separate trials are not possible, the fact is that it is
extremely unlikely that the lawyer will ever testify in court. Like all civil
cases, the vast majority of patent cases settle prior to trial.46 It is very
unlikely that the lawyer-witness rule will ever require disqualification at
trial. It is at best a small factor in deciding whether Rule 9(b) should
apply.
B. Applying Rule 9(b) Implicates Countervailing Policies that are Not
Present in the Usual Fraud Case
In deciding that Rule 9(b) applies to inequitable conduct, courts
have failed to consider the adverse consequences. Applying Rule 9(b)
to inequitable conduct claims undermines or hampers several important
policies.
First, accused infringers are the only parties with standing and
resources to enforce the duty of candor. The Patent Office has never
maintained any independent laboratories. 47 As a consequence, it lacks
facilities to verify experiments submitted to the Patent Office to support
patentability or to conduct any sort of due diligence on communications
from the applicant. If an applicant states that a certain test was run
appeal).
144. Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding
there is no right to jury trial on any aspect of inequitable conduct).
145. See generally id. (noting availability of separate trials).
146. See Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AM.
INTELL. PROP. L.Q.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that more than ninety percent settle).
147. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 439 F.2d 1369, 1379 (5th Cir.
1970); In re Ziegler, 833 F.2d 1024 (table), No. 87-1409, 1987 WL 38838, (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(noting absence of Patent Office laboratory facilities).
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properly, the Patent Office has no means to verify the representation.'"
Accordingly, no one but the accused infringer has the legal and practical
resources, as well as the opportunity and incentive, to thoroughly
investigate the candor and honesty of the applicant.
Second, the public has a strong interest in ensuring that patents are
not issued based upon falsehoods and deception. The public has a
greater interest in determining whether the Patent Office was defrauded
than it does in finding out whether a private party was defrauded.
Patents are affected with the public interest since they restrict economic
freedom, more so since the number of patents has increased
dramatically in recent years' 9  The available statistics suggest that
inequitable conduct is ultimately held to have occurred with surprising
frequency. Specifically, one analysis shows that in 2001, inequitable
conduct was asserted in twenty-seven cases, with the patentee prevailing
in twenty-three of them, or roughly seventy-five percent.'50 The same
occurred in 2000, with the patentee prevailing in fifteen out of twenty
inequitable conduct cases.' 51  These statistics, though far from
conclusive, at least suggest that inequitable conduct is being pleaded as a
defense in roughly twenty percent of all patent suits, and when it is
pleaded, the defendant prevails about twenty-five percent of the time.
If these statistics are representative, then four percent of patents are
unenforceable, a remarkable number given the tremendous burden of
proof that defendants face. 52 A substantial service is provided to the
148. It is common for applicants whose claims are rejected to submit test data to the
Patent Office to show "unexpected results" of the claimed invention or the otherwise
established patentability. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn
Co. 837 F. Supp. 1444, 1475 (N. D. Ind. 1992) (finding inequitable conduct based on test
submission). See generally, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 716.02 (5th
ed.); Alan H. MacPherson et al., Ethics in Patent Practice (A Brief Visit to Several Areas of
Concern), 574 PLI/PAT 657, 700-02 (1999). Inequitable conduct occurs when submitted
tests are false or misleading.
149. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property
Rights For Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 590
& n.36 (1999) (detailing increase in number of applications).
150. UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, PATSTATS: US PATENT LITIGATION
STATISTICS, at http://www.patstats.org/2001.html; see also Allison & Lemley, supra note 129,
at 187 (analyzing validity statistics).
151. UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, PATSTATS: US PATENT LITIGATION
STATISTICS, at http://www.patstats.org/2000.html.
152. Our own review of published Federal Circuit decisions rendered from January 1,
2000 to September 20, 2002, reveals that inequitable conduct was found to have occurred in
six of thirty-two cases where the merits were reached. Specifically, inequitable conduct was
found in Frank's Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR Technologies, Ltd., 292 F. 3d 1363
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public by a successful inequitable conduct defense since it revokes a
patent deceitfully taken from the public.'53
Yet, no court that analyzed whether Rule 9(b) should apply took
these countervailing policies into account. Applying Rule 9(b) to the
defense can cut off discovery, raise pleading hurdles (and thus increase
costs), and so reduce the circumstances in which inequitable conduct
may be raised. Courts should not conclude that Rule 9(b) applies
because it furthers public policy without considering the adverse effects
of doing so on the patent system.
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2001); GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001); LI Second Family Ltd.
P'ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Perseptive Biosystems. Inc. v.
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Semiconductor Energy Laboratory
Co. Ltd. v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
It was not found in Union Carbide Chemicals & Plastics Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil
Co., 308 F.3d 117 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, Inc.,304 F.3d 1256
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Abbott Laboratories v. Torpharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Allen
Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries, Inc., 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Catalina
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728 (Fed. Cir. 2002); University of West Virginia, Board of Trustees v.
Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 257
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2002); LNP Engineering Plastics, Inc. v. Mille Waste Mills, Inc., 275 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Rhone-Poulenc Agro, S. A. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 272 F.3d 1335
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 262 F.3d
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 264 F.3d 1094
(Fed. Cir. 2001); Mentor HIS, Inc. v. Medical Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Purdue
Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Union Pacific
Resources Company v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Ruiz v. A. B.
Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ajinomoto Co., Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland
Co., 228 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Life Technologies, Inc. v. Clontech Laboratories, Inc., 224
F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Upjohn Co. v. Mova Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Fiskars, Inc.
v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Speedplay. Inc. v. Bebop, Inc. 211 F.3d 1245 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
153. There are also other disincentives to pleading inequitable conduct that a typical
fraud plaintiff does not face. A defendant who unsuccessfully asserts inequitable conduct
may find himself on the hook for attorneys' fees. A plaintiff who prevails over an inequitable
conduct defense may be deemed a "prevailing party" and be awarded its fees. Weidinger,
supra note 32, at 1210-11.
That same commentator argued that the existence of Rule 11 sanctions was more likely
to deter improper assertion of inequitable conduct claims. Id. at 1209-10. Many scholars and
commentators argue that Rule 11, as amended, largely reduces the need for Rule 9(b). See
authorities cited supra note 98.
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V. WHAT RULE 9(b) SHOULD REQUIRE OF DEFENDANTS PLEADING
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSES
Perhaps I am wrong about everything. It may be that inequitable
conduct is fraud in terms of Rule 9(b) or, even if it is not, that courts
may be free to rely upon policy grounds to conclude that policies are
best served by requiring heightened pleading, and, if they are, that the
interests of the patent and judicial systems are best served by applying
Rule 9(b) to inequitable conduct claims.5 In light of that possibility,
and of the fact that Rule 9(b) does apply to Walker Process claims, the
following examines what courts have been requiring of defendants, and
then recommends guidelines for courts to apply in measuring the degree
of particularity that should be required.
A. The Current Disagreement Among the District Courts as to the
Requirements of Rule 9(b)
Courts appear to apply an ad hoc approach to what Rule 9(b)
requires in pleading inequitable conduct.' On one end of the spectrum,
the courts almost without exception hold that the bare assertion that a
patent was obtained through fraud or inequitable conduct is insufficient
to satisfy the particularity requirements.1 56 On the other hand, where the
154. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1967).
155. See Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 286 (D. Mass. 2002) (noting that at least
one court requires pleading facts, supporting materiality, and intent).
156. Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348, 359 (W.D.N.Y.
2001) (holding insufficient allegation that patents "may be unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct"); Treatch v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1638,1640 (D. Ariz. 1999)
(holding insufficient claim that patents "is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct during
prosecution of the underlying application."); Optical Coating Lab., Inc. v. Applied Vision
Ltd., No. C-92-4689-MHP, 1995 WL 150513, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995) (claim that the
patent "was obtained only as a result of inequitable conduct practiced on the United States
Patent and Trademark Office" insufficient); Laitram Corp. v. OKI Elec. Indus. Co., 30
U.S.P.Q.2d 1527 (E.D. La. 1994) (claim that plaintiff "breached its duty of candor to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office, with the result that the Lapeyre patent is
unenforceable" did not meet 9(b)); Wicker Group v. Standard Register Co., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
1678, 1679 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding insufficient allegation that patents were "unenforceable
due to positive representations and/or acts of omission before the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office which are inequitable conduct ... ."); Xilinx, Inc. v. Altera Corp., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1149
(N.D. Cal. 1993) (claim that patents "were obtained... through inequitable conduct..." held
insufficient); Energy Absorption Sys. v. Roadway Safety Servs. Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1079, 1080
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that allegation that patent was "void and unenforceable" was
insufficient); Sun-Flex Inc. v. Softview Computer Prods. Corp., 750 F. Supp. 962, 963 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (allegations that plaintiff withheld "material facts including prior art, prior
inventions and patent application(s)" as well as "falsified inventorship," "mischaracterized ...
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inequitable conduct consists of withholding a prior art reference, courts
hold that a pleading identifying the withheld reference and who knew of
its existence is sufficient.'57
Beyond that, however, there is little clarity. Two district court
opinions demonstrate this point. One court found sufficient the
allegation that the patent was unenforceable by reason of the patentee's
"fraudulent and inequitable conduct before the Courts and toward the
public" that consisted of the "assertion of the patent despite plaintiff's
awareness of prior use, sale, and public knowledge of the invention
involved." '  However, another district court found insufficient the
indistinguishable allegation that a patent was unenforceable because the
patentee "had knowledge of publications, public knowledge, public sales
and/or public use pertinent to and affecting the patentability of the
invention.., and failed to disclose same to the United States Patent
Office." 59  The following sections illustrate in more detail the
uncertainties regarding what Rule 9(b) requires in inequitable conduct
cases, and suggests guidelines for its application.
prior public usages," and "misrepresented material facts ... " held insufficient) (alterations in
original); Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163,178 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that
defense which asserted that the patents "were each procured by inequitable conduct" failed
to satisfy Rule 9(b)), aff'd, 870 F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Papst Motoren GMBH & Co. KG v.
Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F. Supp. 864, 870-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allegation that
patentee withheld material information and made misleading arguments insufficient); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Coatings Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 235, 236 (D. Md. 1972) (bare allegation
that patent was unenforceable was insufficient); see also Cardiogenesis Corp. v. PLC Sys.,
Inc., No. 96-20749SW, 1997 WL 12129, at *1 (N. D. Cal. Jan. 8, 1997) (striking pleading that
alleged patent was "unenforceable"); G&H Tech., Inc. v. U.S., 227 U.SIP.Q. 491, 492 (Cl. Ct.
1985) (applying rule identical to Rule 9(b) to find claim that patent was "unenforceable"
because of the "applicants' failure to meet their duties of candor and disclosure" was
insufficient).
The only exception is the district court's decision in Quantum where the court let stand
the defense that the patent was "unenforceable" because it concluded that Rule 9(b) did not
apply to inequitable conduct claims. Quantum is discussed supra, notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
157. Schwarzkopf Techn. Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 820 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D.
Del. 1992) (pleadings which specified "the name of the German patent which Schwarzkopf
allegedly failed to disclose" satisfied Rule 9(b)); Papst Motoren, 629 F. Supp. at 870 (pleading
which specified which reference had been held was sufficient); see also Environ Prods., Inc. v.
Total Containment, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 57, 58 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (rejecting plaintiff's argument
that defendant's ten-page pleading of inequitable conduct was insufficient).
158. Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Industra Prods., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 361, 363 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
159. Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 112 F.R.D. 2, 3 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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1. Uncertainty as to Allegations of Intent
The uncertainties arising from even the most basic allegations of
intent are illustrated by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California decision in Xilinx, Inc. v. Altera Corp.",
The court first held that a naked assertion that the patents "'were
obtained by Xilinx through inequitable conduct'" failed to meet the
requirements of Rule 9(b), and ordered the defendant to re-plead the
defense "'with specificity as to time, place and content of any
misrepresentations.... ',"6 The defendant then filed an amended
answer, which provided:
Upon information and belief, the '302 and '487 patents are
unenforceable because they were obtained by Xilinx through
inequitable conduct in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. During the prosecution of these patents, at least the
following prior art references were neither cited by the patent
examiner nor called to the patent examiner's attention by Xilinx:
a 1967 article by Wahlstrom titled "Programmable logic arrays-
cheaper by the millions"; (2) Wahlstrom United States Patent
No. 3,473,160 issued on October 14, 1969; (3) a 1970 doctoral
thesis by Shoup titled "Programmable Cellular Logic Arrays";
and (4) a 1975 doctoral thesis by Manning titled "Automatic
Test, Configuration, and Repair Cellular Arrays." In addition,
the materiality of other prior art, e.g. Manning United States
Patent No. 4,020,469 was not disclosed to the patent examiner.
Each of these five references was material to the patentability of
the patents in suit. Upon information and belief, those acts and
omissions by or on behalf of Xilinx were either intentional or
evidence an intentional disregard of Xilinx's duty of disclosure to
the Patent and Trademark Office and had the effect of depriving
the Patent and Trademark Office of an opportunity to consider
fairly whether or not the '302 and '487 patents should have
issued.62
The plaintiff moved to strike even this more elaborate statement of
the defense, arguing that the defendant had "failed to plead a required
160. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
161. Id. at 1150.
162. Id. at 1152.
2003]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
element of the affirmative defense, namely an intent to deceive. '"' 63
Even though the defendant had alleged that the plaintiff had acted
"intentional[ly]" or as part of an "intentional disregard of [plaintiff's]
duty of disclosure to the Patent and Trademark Office," the plaintiff
argued that this still did not sufficiently allege an intent to deceive.'
The court agreed and once again struck the defense. It properly
identified the distinction between alleging that an act had been done
intentionally, and alleging that it had been done with an intent to
deceive the Patent Office: "If [defendant] believes it can later prove that
[plaintiff] intended to deceive the PTO-whether through direct or
circumstantial evidence-[defendant's] pleading should, at the very
least, reflect that belief.', 6 6 While the court correctly noted that alleging
that an act had been done intentionally is different from saying it had
been done with an intent to deceive, nowhere in its original opinion
ordering the defendant to re-plead the defense did the court give the
slightest warning that intent had to be pleaded in so many words, so
precisely.
Not only does the burdensome, repetitious briefing in Xilinx
demonstrate the cost of the uncertain requirements concerning intent,
other courts have held that pleadings passed muster under 9(b) with
allegations of intent virtually identical to the one found lacking in
Xilinx.'7 Litigants do not know whether specific words are required.
2. Uncertainty as to Specificity Required in Identifying the Deceptive
Statement or Omission
The courts apply inconsistent standards as to how specifically the
defendant must identify the deceptive statement. Some courts impose
163. Id. at 1153.
164. Id. at 1152.
165. Id. at 1153.
166. Id.
167. For example, in Raychem Corp. v. PSI Telecommunications, Inc., No. C-93-20920
RPA, 1995 WL 108193 *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1995), the defendant plead that the patentee had
failed to disclose a prior art reference to the Patent Office and "such failure to disclose ...
was intentional and constitutes inequitable conduct making any such patent unenforceable."
The court held that this met the requirements of Rule 9(b), noting that the defendant had
plead that the patentee had "intentionally failed to disclose knowledge of the... a Dobbin
patent [withheld reference] to the Patent Office." Id. at *3.
Similarly, the court in Poly-Am., Inc. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., No. A 3:96-CV-2690,
1998 WL 355477, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 1998), found that numerous accusations of
inequitable conduct complied with Rule 9(b) even though the defendant did not plead "intent
to deceive," but instead only that the acts had been done intentionally.
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requirements bordering on-if not requiring-evidence-pleading. For
example, one district court held that the following allegation was
insufficient under Rule 9(b):
U.S. Patent No. 5,156,949 is unenforceable pursuant to the
doctrine of inequitable conduct. In an effort to avoid the patent
examiner's obviousness rejection, Chiron intentionally misled the
examiner about the state of the art. In particular, on September
14, 1990, Dr. Kathelyn Sue Steimer swore to an affidavit
containing information about the likelihood that recombinant
antigens would be as effective as natural antigens when used in
an HIV diagnostic assay. This affidavit was filed with the U.S.
Patent Office, and was deceptive and misleading.
Even though the defendant had specified the statement and
explained how it was deceptive, the court held that the defense was
insufficient because the affidavit contained fifteen paragraphs. The
court asserted that the defendant "has no way of knowing from the
sparse accusation which of these paragraphs forms the basis for Abbott's
accusations. Is it the conclusions Dr. Steimer draws, the facts on which
she bases those conclusions, or some other specific statement in the
affidavit? "169
Other courts take a different approach. For example, some courts
have held that the defendant must plead: "(1) the particular statements,
misrepresentations, or omissions made; (2) when the complained of acts
or omissions occurred; (3) the reason why those acts or omissions were
inequitable; and (4) the basis for the belief."'70
The uncertainty as to the required degree of specificity also reveals
itself in the split over whether a defendant must plead the time, place,
and substance of any misrepresentation. A number of courts have held
that Rule 9(b) requires that the defendant plead "at least the time, place
and substance of any misrepresentation or material omission."' At the
168. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
169. Id.
170. Laitram Corp. v. OKI Elec. Indus. Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1527, 1533 (E.D. La. 1994);
Wolf v. Wagner Spray Tech. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1690, 1693 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Plaintiff must
"outline the specific statements made, the defendant who made them, and the time and place
they were made" as well as "the reasons why those statements were fraudulent and the basis
for this belief.").
171. Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1988), affd, 870
F.2d 642 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 286 (D. Mass. 2002)
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same time, another line of cases expressly rejects the time-place-
substance requirement. 2
Requiring a defendant to plead the time, place and content of the
misrepresentations is unhelpful. Requiring the defendant to plead the
specific time that the misrepresentation occurred is meaningless where
the allegation is the failure to submit material prior art. If an applicant
knew of a material prior art reference, but failed to disclose it during the
three years that the patent was prosecuted, what is the time of the
omission?'73 Furthermore, requiring the defendant to plead only time,
(holding that defendant must plead time, place, and content); ASM Am., Inc. v. Genus, Inc.,
No. 01-2190EDL, 2002 WL 24444, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2002) (Rule 9(b) requires pleading
of "time, place."); In re Papst Licensing GMBH Patent Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (E.D.
La. 2001) (defendant must "state the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent
activity."); Systemation, Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[Alt a
minimum, Engel is required to state the time, place and content of the alleged inequitable
conduct."); Poly-Am., Inc. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., No. A3:96-CV-690, 1998 WL 355477, *3
(N.D. Tex. June 29, 1998) (Party must "specify the time, place and any alleged
misrepresentation"); Videojet Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Eagle Inks, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049
(N.D. 11. 1998) (Party "must plead the 'who, what, when, and where' of the alleged
inequitable conduct.") (quoting Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 F.2d 918, 923 (7th
Cir. 1992)); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Dataram Corp., No. 96-207-08, 1997 WL 50272, at *4
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 1997) (Party must "specify the time, place, and content of any alleged
misrepresentations to the PTO."); Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1770, 1775 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("[D]efendant is required to 'state the time, place and
specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the
misrepresentation."') (quoting Schreiber Distrib. v. Serv-Well Furn. Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401
(9th Cir. 1986)); Optical Coating Lab., Inc. v. Applied Vision Ltd., No. C-92-4689-MHP, 1995
WL 150513 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 1995) (defendant must allege "time, place and nature of the
alleged fraudulent activities"); Samsung Elec. Co. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1673 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (requiring time, place, and contents of false statement be plead);
InterDigital Tech. Corp v. OKI Am., Inc., 21 S.A., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1848, 1850 (S.D. Ind. 1994)
("[Dlefendants must specifically plead the time, place, and content of any alleged
misrepresentations the plaintiffs made to the PTO, and the requisite intent."); Energy
Absorption Sys. v. Roadway Safety Serv., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1079, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("[W]e
shall require Roadway to specifically plead the time, place, and content of any alleged
misrepresentation that Energy made to the Patent and Trademark Office .... ); Sun-Flex Co.
v. Softview Computer Prods. Corp., 750 F. Supp. 962, 963 (N.D. Ill. 1990) ("[D]efendants
must specify the time, place, and content of any alleged misrepresentations that plaintiffs
made to the PTO.").
172. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P. v. Verizon Communication, Inc., No. 01-5627,
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12982, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("there is no 'date, place, or time'
requirement"); Union Carbide Chem. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 99-CV-274-
SLR, 2000 WL 1481015, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2000) ("Rule 9(b) does not require that the
pleadings allege the time, date, and place of the alleged misconduct.") (citing EMC Corp. v.
Storage Tech. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (D. Del. 1996)).
173. One defendant made this point, arguing that the "time of the inequitable
conduct"-which was allegedly withholding material prior art-as being "during the
prosecution of the '346 patent .... " Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 41
WRONG ABOUT EVERYTHING
place, and speaker is under-inclusive because it does not require the
defendant to plead why the speaker knew the information was false or
misleading.
3. The Disagreement as to Whether Material Not Pleaded in the
Answer May be Considered in Determining Whether the Defendant
Complied with Rule 9(b)
The courts disagree on whether discovery can or must take the place
of pleading with the specificity required by Rule 9(b). The cases are in
such disarray as to provide no guidance to litigants.
A few courts hold that the particularity demanded by Rule 9(b) can
only be met through a pleading-a complaint or an answer,
typically-and discovery responses or other disclosures cannot take the
place of a particularized pleading of fraud.17' These courts refuse to
consider any facts not recited in a pleading in determining whether the
plaintiff has notice of the basis of the inequitable conduct claim.7 For
example, one court granted summary judgment to the patentee on an
affirmative defense of inequitable conduct, rejecting the defendant's
position that, though its answer was insufficient under Rule 9(b), it had
pleaded facts in its brief in opposition to the summary judgment.
Instead, the court held that "[h]aving failed to allege those facts in its
U.S.P.Q.2d 1770, 1775 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The court apparently found this allegation sufficient,
but struck the defense because "[miost significantly, defendant has not provided the
particulars of what ACS or... [plaintiff] failed to disclose and the circumstances indicating
ACS's intent to mislead the PTO .... Id.
Other courts reason that the pleading of "time" is satisfied if the defendant pleads that
the conduct occurred "during prosecution." See Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264,286 (D.
Mass. 2002); Poly-American, Inc. v. 65E Lining Tech., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-2690, 1998 WL
355477, at * 3 (N.D. Tex. June 28,1998).
Likewise, requiring the pleading of the place-which is the Patent Office-gives no
meaning, but notice. Yet, courts require pleading of the place where the misrepresentation
occurred. See Dataquill Ltd. v. Handspring, Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1920 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
174. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Oncor Inc., 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1330 (N.D. Cal.
1997) ("Notice in the form of discovery requests and in the moving papers cannot serve as a
substitute for the pleadings."); Energy Absorption Sys. Inc. v. Roadway Safety Serv., 28
U.S.P.Q.2d 1079, 1080 (N.D. 11. 1992) (requiring defendant to amend its answer to state the
facts it had disclosed in discovery responses); Sun-Flex Co. v. Softview Computer Prods.
Corp., 750 F. Supp. 962, 964 (N.D. I11. 1990) ("While an interrogatory answer submitted by
defendants contains some examples of the alleged inequitable conduct, the court finds that it
would be more appropriate for defendants to properly amend their answer before the parties
embark on extensive discovery regarding the issue of fraud.").
175. See cases cited supra, note 174.
2003]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
pleadings, [the defendant] cannot rely on them to defeat this motion."176
On the other hand, several district courts have held that, even if the
defendant's answer fails to meet the requirements of Rule 9(b),
dismissal is inappropriate where an interrogatory response provides the
requisite details.1' These courts have held that the "Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 'do not contemplate that parties will amend their
pleadings to reflect new information obtained in the discovery
process.'""78 In these courts, a defendant "cannot be faulted for failing
to plead with particularity in its answer a fraud that it later learned
about during pretrial discovery.""' 9 Finally, several courts have gone
further and after finding a claim insufficient under Rule 9(b) have
ordered the party asserting the claim "to conduct such discovery as is
necessary to develop this information and file an amended complaint. "8
176. Optical Coating Lab., Inc. v. Applied Vision Ltd., No. C-92-4689-MHP, 1995 WL
150513, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 20, 1995); see also In re Papst Licensing GMBH Patent Litig.,
174 F. Supp. 2d 446, 449 (E.D. La. 2001) ("IBM's pleading deficiencies cannot be cured
through correspondence."); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1876, 1876-77(S.D. Fla. 1997) (refusing to consider allegations of inequitable conduct raised only in
opposition to motion for summary judgment). But cf Bonilla v. Trebol Motors Corp., 150
F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir. 1998) (in non-patent case, holding that facts alleged in opposition to
motion for summary judgment should be considered in determining sufficiency of
allegations).
177. See, e.g., Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Industra Prods., Inc., 64 F.R.D. 361, 363 (N.D. Ind.
1974) (stating in dicta that "as a practical matter, it is evident that considerable detailed
information related to the alleged fraud has been disclosed in the response to plaintiff's
interrogatories .... ); see also Schwarzkopf Tech. Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 820 F.
Supp. 150, 154 (D. Del. 1992) (denying motion to strike an insufficient inequitable conduct
defense because the defendant had filed supplemental affirmative defenses which provided
the requisite detail).
178. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Abbott Labs., No. 90C 7-338, 1992 WL 245642,
at *2 (N.D Ill. Sept. 18, 1992) (quoting Ash v. Wallenmeyer, 879 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1989)).
In an unusual decision, the Northern District of Illinois in du Pont held that where the
defendant provided the requisite details regarding its inequitable conduct defense in the
pretrial order, the fact that it failed to include those details in its answer or in response to
outstanding discovery requests did not bar its assertion. Id. at *2-3. Apparently, the plaintiff
did not argue that the defendant had failed to seasonably amend its answers to discovery.
Other courts have granted defendants leave to amend to plead inequitable conduct with
specificity after details have been uncovered during discovery. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v.
Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d 1736 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (court granted motion to
amend); see also Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1135 (S.D.
Ind. 1999) (treating amendment proffered by defendant as if it had been made in order to
address on the merits patentee's summary judgment motion).
179. E.I. du Pont, 1992 WL 245642, *3 (citing Ash, 879 F.2d at 274).
180. Parish v. Beneficial Illinois, Inc., No. N. 94 C 4156, 1996 WL 172127, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 10, 1996); see also Rachman Bag Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 839 F. Supp. 998, 1001(E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The defense was later withdrawn without prejudice, pending the discovery
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The United States District Court for the District of Delaware-a
critical battleground in patent litigation-has taken confusing positions
on even this narrow point. On the one hand, it permitted .defendants
whose pleadings were insufficient on their face to provide what the
court held was the necessary detail by relying on interrogatory
answers."' In other cases, it held that interrogatory responses cannot be
used to supplement pleadings if the pleadings are themselves deficient, 2
necessary to meet the particular pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) .... ").
181. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., Inc. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d
1562, 1563-64 (D. Del. 1988) (denying motion to strike allegation that "inventors were aware
of relevant prior art which was not identified to the Patent Office" because defendant had
clarified its pleadings in interrogatory responses by stating that plaintiff had identified no
prior art in its application).
However, later, the Delaware district court incorrectly characterized Scripps as involving
a case where the pleading was adequate, and that the Scripps court had "referred to the
clarifications in the interrogatories only as support for its conclusion that the pleadings were
sufficient on their face." EMC Corp. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (D. Del.
1996). In fact, Scripps is unclear, since even in the interrogatory answer no specific art was
identified as having been improperly withheld. The Scripps court arguably only used the
interrogatory to confirm the sufficiency of the answer, or it may have relied on it for a critical
detail.
182. In EMC Corp., 921 F. Supp. at 1263, the plaintiff had sued the defendant for
infringing one patent. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant disclosed prior art to
the plaintiff in response to an interrogatory. At that time, the plaintiff was prosecuting
another patent. Id. When that patent issued, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was
infringing it. Id. The defendant argued that the patent was unenforceable because the
plaintiff had failed to disclose to the Patent Office the prior art that the defendant had
identified in its interrogatory response. Id. The defendant plead its inequitable conduct
defense in great detail:
The Ludlam '857 patent-in-suit is unenforceable due to inequitable conduct
practiced by STK, its employees and its agent(s) during the prosecution of the
Ludlam '857 patent-in-suit. The failure of STK, its employees or agent(s) to disclose
to the United States Patent Office material prior art known to STK prior to the
issuance of the Ludlam '857 patent-in-suit constitutes inequitable conduct. For
example, EMC made STK aware of material prior art to the Ludlam '857
patent-in-suit by EMC's Supplemental Response to STK's Interrogatory Nos. 10-17,
served on STK on July 25, 1995, prior to the October 17, 1995 issuance of the
Ludlam '857 patent-in-suit. The Supplemental Response to STK's Interrogatory
Nos. 10-17 identified material prior art not disclosed by STK to the United States
Patent Office. Since STK has brought to the attention of the patent examiner the
prior art cited by EMC in EMC's initial Response to STK's Interrogatory Nos.
10-17, yet failed to do so for the July 25, 1995 response, it is clear that such a
withholding by STK was willful with the intent to mislead the patent examiner
wrongfully into allowing the case. Furthermore, upon information and belief, STK
and those substantially involved in the prosecution of the patent-in-suit failed to
advise the patent examiner of other known remote dual copy prior art and did so
with the intent to mislead the patent examiner into allowing the '857 patent-in-suit
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but they can be used to supplement pleadings which comply with Rule
9(b). 183  The Delaware approach makes little sense and creates
uncertainty and room for gamesmanship. It makes little sense because,
if the pleading is sufficient under Rule 9(b), then no clarification is
required in a brief. It leaves uncertainty and room for mischief because
a defendant cannot rely on its interrogatory responses to provide
additional detail unless its answer meets Rule 9(b)-and it will know
that only if the plaintiff complains.
The courts provide no guidance as to whether accused infringers
may rely on discovery responses or are limited to their answers. This
allows for dismissal of important matters of public concern due to
pleading games rather than on the merits, and is antithetical to the
purposes of the Federal Rules."4
B. A Better Approach
1. Federal Circuit Law Applies
The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to procedural
matters "that are not unique to patent issues."'85 The district courts
have, without exception, applied regional circuit law to the question of
what Rule 9(b) requires of accused infringers who plead inequitable
conduct.'86
to issue.
Id. at 1262-63. However, the court held that the pleading was insufficient under Rule 9(b)
because it referred to the interrogatory response for the identity of the prior art. Id. at 1263.
The court held that the defendant could not refer to its interrogatory response, but instead
had to mention the prior art in its answer. Id. at 1264.
183. Id. at 1263. Likewise, briefs of the defendant can "clarify" a pleading which is
sufficient on its face. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 99-
CV-279-SLR, 2000 WL 1481015, at *2 (D. Del. Sept. 29,2000).
184. A patentee's demand that the details be plead in a public pleading turns Rule 9(b)'s
policy of avoiding embarrassing public charges of fraud on its head. In addition, the patentee
can choose to impose costs on the defendant of amending its answer even though the
requisite details have been disclosed to the plaintiff in discovery.
185. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
186. Only two cases actually considered whether courts should follow regional circuit
law or the law of the Federal Circuit, and both applied regional circuit law. Davidson v. Cao,
211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 285-86 (D. Mass. 2002); Systemation, Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183
F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998). The rest of the courts applied the law of their circuit in
determining what Rule 9(b) required of accused infringers, though without analyzing the
propriety of applying regional circuit law. Videojet Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Eagle Inks, Inc., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Seventh Circuit standards); EMC Corp., 921 F.
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However, Federal Circuit law should apply to the question of
whether Rule 9(b) applies to inequitable conduct, and if so, how it
applies. Procedural matters that "are related to patent issues" are
governed by Federal Circuit law."7 A procedural issue is related to
patent issues where it (1) is itself a "substantive patent law" issue; (2)
"pertain[s] to patent law;" (3) "bear[s] an essential relationship to
matters committed to [the Federal Circuit's] exclusive control by
statute;" or (4) "clearly implicate[s] the jurisprudential responsibilities
of [the Federal Circuit] in a field within its exclusive jurisdiction .... ,,18'
Under any of these tests, Federal Circuit law applies. Its application
can be outcome determinative. Foremost, whether an allegation
sufficiently alleges "inequitable conduct" is clearly a substantive patent
issue turning entirely on federal patent law decided by the Federal
Circuit.'89 In addition, if, as some courts hold, a defendant may not seek
discovery without first pleading the defense in detail, the defense will be
foreclosed in many cases. Accordingly, Federal Circuit law controls.9 °
Supp. at 1263 (applying Third Circuit law); Samsung Elec. Co. v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 39
U.S.P.Q.2d 1673 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (applying Fifth Circuit standards); Optical Coating Lab.,
Inc. v. Applied Vision Ltd., No. C-92-4689MHP, 1995 WL 150513 (N.D. Cal. March 20, 1995)
(applying Ninth Circuit standards).
187. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575 n.14 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
188. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Midwest Indus., Inc.
v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356,1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
189. Where the procedural issue turns on a substantive area of patent law, then Federal
Circuit law applies. Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Although Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law in applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
because they "commonly involve procedural matters unrelated to patent law issues as such" it
would apply Federal Circuit law to the denial of a motion under that rule where the precise
issue turns on a substantive patent issue).
190. Virtually all other procedural issues are subject to the law of the regional circuit,
since they "involve[] an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure not unique to
patent law." Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(regional circuit law governed sanctions granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37); see, e.g.,
Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (regional circuit law
applies to denial of motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)); Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285
F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (regional circuit law applies to preservation of error under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51); Kohus v. Toys R. US, Inc., 282 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (award of
costs under Rule 54(d) governed by regional circuit law); Vulncan Eng'g Co. v. Fata
Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (regional law applied to timeliness of
motion for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59); Arachnid, Inc. v. Medalist Mktg. Corp., 972
F.2d 1300, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (question of inconsistency of jury findings is governed by
regional circuit law); Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 962 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(operation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is governed by regional circuit law); Wang Lab., Inc. v.
Applied Computer Sciences, Inc., 958 F.2d 355, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that operation
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However, the district courts uniformly-if unthinkingly-apply
regional circuit law. The only court to consider the issue of whether
regional circuit law would control reasoned that it should.19' That
district court relied on Formax Inc. v. Hostert,"' to support its conclusion
that regional circuit law applied. Formax, however, did not involve an
appeal of a patent issue,'93 and so did not analyze whether the Federal
Circuit would apply its law to whether Rule 9(b) applied to inequitable
conduct. Instead, Formax analyzed whether a RICO violation had been
pleaded in conformance with that rule,' concluding that regional circuit
law determined whether a RICO claim had been pleaded.'
The application of regional circuit law by the remaining courts is
particularly inexplicable in light of their own repeated observation that
the Federal Circuit has not passed upon whether Rule 9(b) applies. 9'
The fact that many of the district courts have mentioned that the
Federal Circuit has not yet addressed whether Rule 9(b) applies
suggests that they recognize the question is bound up in patent law, and
that the Federal Circuit's decision controls, not the decisions of the
regional circuit. If Federal Circuit law controls as to whether Rule 9(b)
applies, then clearly Federal Circuit law controls how the Rule should
be applied. The practice of these courts, however, of applying regional
standards to patent cases is incompatible with the notion that Federal
Circuit law governs the issue.
2. A Proposed Framework for Application of Rule 9(b) to Inequitable
Conduct Claims
This section advocates a uniform application of Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct. It first argues that discovery should be granted into
of judicial estoppel is controlled by regional circuit's law); Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574-75
(noting that attorney disqualification is governed by regional circuit law).
191. Systemation, Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998). The
court in Davidson v. Cao, 211 F. Supp. 2d 264, 286 (D. Mass. 2002), relied on Systemation for
its conclusions that regional circuit law applied.
192. 841 F.2d 388 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
193. Id. at 389 ("The patent count is not involved in the present appeal.").
194. Id. at 389-90.
195. Id. at 390. Significantly, the Formax court cited Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1575. The
Panduit court states that when the Federal Circuit "review[s] procedural matters that do not
pertain to patent issues, we sit as if we were the particular regional circuit court where appeals
from the district court we are reviewing would normally lie." Id. The Formax court thereby
recognized that whether a civil RICO claim has been properly plead is a procedural issue that
does not pertain to patent issues.
196. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 1.
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facts relating to inequitable conduct, even if not pleaded. Second, it
argues that amendment to plead an inequitable conduct defense should
be freely given, and that courts should view arguments of delay or
prejudice with skepticism. Finally, it describes allegations defendants
ought to be required to plead to comply with Rule 9(b) when alleging
common types of inequitable conduct.
a. Discovery Should be Broadly Allowed Even Without an Allegation of
Inequitable Conduct, and into Areas Broader than a Properly Pleaded
Allegation
Because of the fact that the defendant is a stranger to the patentee's
communications with the Patent Office, the public interest in ferreting
out inequitable conduct, and the lack of enforcement by the Patent
Office, courts should not permit Rule 9(b) to be used to prevent
discovery into whether inequitable conduct has occurred."9 Thus, where
a defendant has not pleaded inequitable conduct, discovery into whether
such conduct occurred should still be allowed. Likewise, where a
defendant has pleaded inequitable conduct in compliance with Rule
9(b), discovery should still be allowed more broadly than the issues
pleaded.
Nor should the defendant be required to plead that there are
"other" examples of inequitable conduct in order to keep the door open
for supplementation."' During discovery in a patent suit, the
197. Where the accused infringer has a reasonable apprehension of being sued for
infringement of a patent, it can bring a declaratory judgment action against the patent owner.
Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993). Despite the fact that accused
infringers frequently bring declaratory judgment actions in order to resolve whether they
infringe a valid patent, in only one such case did the accused infringer seek a declaration that
the patent was unenforceable. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Coatings Co., 176 U.S.P.Q. 235,
236 (D. Md. 1972). In that case, the court held that the bare allegation that the patent was
unenforceable was insufficient and ordered the defendant to replead. Id.
Where, as in PPG Industries, an accused infringer brings an affirmative claim of
inequitable conduct in a declaratory judgment action, then the accused infringer more closely
stands in the same posture as a plaintiff who brings a claim for fraud. There is less asymmetry
of information between a fraud plaintiff and defendant, on the one hand, and an inequitable
conduct defendant and the patentee on the other. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, even a plaintiff seeking a declaration that a patent is unenforceable is not in the
same position as the typical fraud plaintiff.
198. In Agere Sys. Guardian Corp. v. Proxim, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 726, 733 (D. Del.
2002), the defendant plead specific instances of inequitable conduct but also stated that there
may be "other" instances. The court rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the defendant
could not later identify additional instances of inequitable conduct. Id. at 734. A defendant
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information disclosing whether inequitable conduct has occurred will
reside in the plaintiff's hands. Yet, courts have intimated that discovery
can be limited to the specific inequitable conduct pleaded.'99 The better
rule is that a party should not be limited to the inequitable conduct
pleaded. Again, the usual protections afforded to litigants should
provide ample protection against unwarranted fishing expeditions,
particularly since the scope of discovery will be limited.
b. Amendments Should be Freely Given
Because at the outset of a patent suit the defendant will be unlikely
to possess sufficient facts to plead inequitable conduct at the level of
detail demanded by Rule 9(b),2 ° courts should be willing to permit
defendants to amend pleadings to include the inequitable conduct
defense; allow discovery responses to provide the requisite details, or, at
least where there is no surprise, to permit the pretrial order to do so."
Opposition to amendment or other claims by the plaintiff of delay or
prejudice should be carefully scrutinized, since a plaintiff should not be
able to use Rule 9(b) to preclude defendants from asserting inequitable
conduct claims before they discover the specific factual basis, but then
argue unfair delay when the defendant raises the claim promptly after
those facts were discovered and apprehended.w Accordingly, in
who has properly plead inequitable conduct, however, should not be required to plead that
there are "other" instances in order to have the right to identify them in discovery or to
amend later to assert those specific instances. Whether a defendant properly amends to
assert such later-found claims, or properly identifies them in response to a discovery request,
is governed by Rule 15 and Rule 26, not Rule 9(b).
199. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., No. 99-CV-274-
SLR, 2000 WL 1481015, at *3 (D. Del. Sept. 29, 2000) ("[I]nsufficiently pled allegations of
inequitable conduct shall not be used to justify subsequent discovery into such allegations.");
Sun-Flex Co. v. Softview Computer Prods. Corp., 750 F. Supp. 962, 964 (N.D. I11. 1990)
("While an interrogatory answer submitted by defendants contains some examples of the
alleged inequitable conduct, the court finds that it would be more appropriate for defendants
to properly amend their answer before the parties embark on extensive discovery regarding
the issue of fraud.").
200. See supra note 101-09 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 348, 360
(W.D.N.Y. 2001) ("[T]he court dismisses counterclaims five and six without prejudice and
directs SRC to seek leave to amend its pleadings again once SRC believes it has discovered
information that can form the basis for properly pled counterclaims based upon inequitable
conduct."); Go Med. Indus. PTY, Ltd. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 1:93 CV-1538-HTW, 1995 WL
605802, at *5 (N.D. Ga. July 6, 1995) (permitting defendant to amend answer to allege
inequitable conduct claims based upon facts learned during discovery); Sun-Flex Co., 750 F.
Supp. at 964 (striking answer but giving defendants twenty days to amend their answer).
202. A few courts have recognized that the hurdle created by Rule 9(b) should be taken
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assessing whether a defendant has unnecessarily delayed or a plaintiff
would be prejudiced by amendment, courts should take into account
that the defendant may not have asserted the defense to avoid violating
Rule 9(b).2 O
into account when a defendant later seeks to amend to assert inequitable conduct. For
example, in Go Med., the defendant moved to amend its answer to allege an inequitable
conduct defense. In allowing amendment the court reasoned:
In response, plaintiff claims that defendant has known about the alleged facts
supporting its motion since September 1994, thus defendant failed to move to amend
its answer within a reasonable time. While defendant may have obtained some
information to support its new allegations in September of 1994, this court will not
penalize defendant for obtaining additional, confirming information in January 1995
to support its claims--especially given that Rule 9(b) requires that allegations of
fraud, such as inequitable conduct before the U.S. Patent Office, be stated with
particularity.
Plaintiff also claims that it would be substantially prejudiced if defendant's
motion (filed at the close of discovery) was granted, as plaintiff would be unable to
conduct discovery regarding these new allegations. This court is not persuaded by
this argument either. Plaintiff has not indicated the type of discovery it would desire
undertake if defendant's motion is granted; in addition, plaintiff does not claim that
defendant possesses any documents or other information that would be relevant to
its claims that plaintiff acted inequitably.
This court concludes that Rule 15(a) and applicable case law dictate that
defendant should be allowed to amend its answer. Plaintiff has not shown that the
amendment would cause undue delay, would prejudice plaintiff, or would be futile.
Nor has plaintiff shown bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of defendant. Thus,
this court GRANTS defendant's motion for leave to amend answer.
1995 WL 605802, at *4 (footnotes omitted); see also Rhone-Poulenc Agro S.A. v. Montesanto
Co., 73 F. Supp. 2d 537, 538-39 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (allowing amendment after deadline for
amending pleadings had passed since "by waiting until after the depositions to file its Motion,
Montesanto... [defendant] appropriately fulfilled its obligation to investigate its claim
thoroughly prior to making it"); Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Inc., 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1369, 1373 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (allowing amendment even after fact discovery closed
over plaintiff's objection of prejudice since plaintiff "was unable to articulate any specific
examples of how it would be prejudiced or what it would have done differently had it been
made aware of this defense earlier.").
203. The court did so in Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc. v. Scimed Life Systems,
Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1237, 1247 (N.D. Cal. 1997). There the defendant sought leave to amend to
assert an inequitable conduct defense. Id. at 1241. The plaintiff opposed the motion to
amend, contending that the defendant had known of the facts underlying the defense from
the time it obtained the prosecution history from the patent office. Id. at 1247. The
defendant argued that it had not delayed since it filed for leave to amend as soon as it took
the deposition of the inventor who had met with the examiner. Id. The court rejected the
notion of undue delay, recognizing that "because the legal theory implicates Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b), requiring pleading of fraud with particularity, [defendant] was entitled
to confirm factual allegations before amending to include the inequitable conduct defense."
Id. Similarly, where a defendant pleads inequitable conduct without the requisite detail,
dismissal should "almost always" be accompanied by leave to amend. Townshend v.
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c. The Specificity Required Should Depend on the Nature of the
Inequitable Conduct Alleged, but Allegations of Time and Place are
Largely Superfluous
With respect to the level of detail required, rather than following
regional circuit law which is not tailored to inequitable conduct, courts
should impose requirements that are specific to the kind of inequitable
conduct alleged. Although inequitable conduct can take a myriad of
forms, the following gives some guidance on common fact patterns.
Because inequitable conduct turns on the intent and knowledge of a
single person, the accused infringer should be required to identify which
person knew of the material information and either failed to disclose it
or misrepresented it.2' Averments that the attorneys or the plaintiff
(where the plaintiff is a corporate entity) knew of the misrepresentation
should be held insufficient, since it is not enough that someone
employed by the corporation knew of material information; a person
substantively involved in the prosecution must have known it.05
Similarly, if a submission allegedly was made without disclosing material
information, the accused infringer should be required to identify the
person involved in prosecution who knew the information.
Second, because inequitable conduct arises only if material
information is withheld or misrepresented, the accused infringer should
be required to plead facts explaining why the information was material
to patentability. For example, if testing data was allegedly improperly
withheld, the defendant should state why an examiner would have found
the data important in allowing the patent. Did it undercut data that was
submitted? Did it show that the results that were submitted were
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (dismissing claim for failure
to comply with Rule 9(b) but also granting leave to amend); JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., 2
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE § 9:03[4] n.48 (3d ed. 2002).
204. In re Papst Licensing GMBH Patent Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 446,449 (E.D. La. 2001)
("A pleading should also identify the person who made the misrepresentations .... ). The
Papst court went on to state that the pleading should identify "what that person obtained by
making the misrepresentation." Id. Requiring the defendant to plead what the plaintiff
obtained is not correct. "Obtaining something" is not an element of inequitable conduct. See
supra note 8 and accompanying text. The defendant is not required to show that but for the
misrepresentation or omission, the applicant would not have received the patent. Instead, it
must merely establish that a reasonable examiner would have found the information
important in making that decision. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. But see Poly-Am., Inc. v. GSE
Lining Techn., Inc., No. A 3:96-CV-2690, 1998 WL 355477, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 1998)
(finding pleading which alleged that a corporate "[d]efendant and its attorneys" committed
inequitable conduct by failing to disclose, or misrepresenting, various facts).
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atypical? Similarly, if prior art has been withheld, the defendant should
state whether the art was anticipatory or, if not, why it would have been
important to the decision to allow the patent to issue.
Third, if prior art was allegedly withheld, the defendant should be
required to identify the reference and the identity of the person
substantively involved in the prosecution who knew about it.' In many
cases, that may be enough to satisfy Rule 9(b). However, where the
patent claims are complex, prosecution history is especially involved or
complicated, or where the withheld reference is unusually long or
arcane, the defendant may be required to identify which claim element
the reference is material to, which portion of the reference is material,
or both. For example, if a patentee is accused of withholding a chemical
dictionary, the defendant should be required to identify which definition
from the dictionary is material.
Fourth, if test data was allegedly misrepresented, the defendant
should be required to specify the test data (by referring to bates number
or lab notebook pages, for example); specify the submission to the
Patent Office where the data was misrepresented; to identify the
persons who were substantively involved in the prosecution of the
patent who knew of the data; and to briefly explain why any inaccuracy
in the submission would have been material to the examiner.'
Similarly, where data material to patentability was allegedly withheld,
206. See, e.g., In re Papst, 174 F. Supp. 2d at 448 (allegation insufficient since it did not
specify prior art that had been withheld); Rhone-Poulenc Agro S.A. v. Monsanto Co., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 537, 539 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (allegation sufficient because it identified which prior art
had been withheld); Systemation, Inc. v. Engel Indus., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 49, 51 (D. Mass. 1998)
(allegation insufficient because it failed to identify which prior art had been withheld);
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. Inc. v. Medtronic Inc., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1770, 1775 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (allegation insufficient since it did not specify what art had been withheld); EMC Corp.
v. Storage Tech. Corp., 921 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (D. Del. 1996) (allegation which did not
specify which prior art was withheld was insufficient); Raychem Corp. v. PSI Telecomm., Inc.,
No. C-93-20920 RPA, 1995 WL 108193, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1995) (holding allegation
sufficient where it alleged in-house counsel was familiar with a specific prior art reference but
had failed to disclose it to the Patent Office); Schwarzkopf Tech. Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting
Tool Co., 820 F. Supp. 150, 154 (D. Del. 1992) (allegation which identified prior art was
sufficient); Intel Corp. v. Hyundai Elecs. Am., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 & n. 2 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (allegation that two specific patents should have been disclosed as anticipatory prior art
held sufficient); Papst Motoren GMBH & Co. KG v. Kanematsu-Goshu (U.S.A.), Inc., 629 F.
Supp. 864, 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (allegation which identified the prior art withheld and the
person who knew of it sufficient).
207. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Abbott Labs., No. 90-C-7338, 1992 WL 245642,
at *3 (N.D I11. Sept. 18, 1992).
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the defendant should specify the data."'
Fifth, if an affidavit or Office action was submitted which contained
misleading statements of fact, the defendant should be required to
specify, not just the submission, but "to state specifically what part of
that document is deceptive. "2°9 Submissions to the PTO can be lengthy,
and merely identifying the document in toto in many cases will be
insufficient.210 The defendant should also allege why the passage is
deceptive.'
Sixth, if the applicant had made and intentionally failed to disclose
an invalidating prior public use or sale, the defendant should be
required to identify when and where the sale or use was made. For
example, the defendant should be required to plead the date of the sale,
the identity of the buyer, and the identity of any documents evidencing
the sale. 12
d. Defendants Should be Allowed to Use Interrogatories to Provide
Minutiae
Where a defendant adequately pleads inequitable conduct, he
should not be required to amend his answer each time he locates
additional instances of inequitable conduct. 13 As noted above, several
208. Rhone-Poulenc Agro S.A., 73 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39 (finding pleading complied with
Rule 9(b) since it identified "the specific information regarding... testing that should have
been..." submitted to the Patent Office).
209. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219,222 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
210. Id. (holding that merely identifying a seven page, fifteen paragraph affidavit was
insufficient).
211. Videojet Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Eagle Inks, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(upholding inequitable conduct claim where defendant explained why submission was
deceptive and material); see, e.g., Miller Pipeline Corp. v. British Gas PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d
1129,1135-37 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
212. Poly-Am., Inc. v. GSE Lining Tech., Inc., No. A 3:96-CV-2690, 1998 WL 355477, at
*4 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 1998) (holding claim properly plead where it identified when and
where prior public use had been made). Some courts have held sufficient allegations that the
patentee failed to disclose that a product as claimed "was in public use" before the alleged
invention. Intel Corp. v. Hyundai Elecs. Am., Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1113, 1116 & n.2 (N.D. Cal.
1987). These general allegations should be held to be insufficient: the defendant should
identify, by model number or other identifier, what product or process allegedly constituted
the prior sale or use. See Horwitt v. Movado Watch Agency, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 687, 690
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (pleading which identified by year and model numbers the alleged prior sales
held sufficient under Rule 9(b)).
213. But see Energy Absorption Sys. v. Roadway Safety Serv. Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1079,




courts have held that requiring a defendant to plead what he has placed
in his interrogatory answers places form over substance:214 notice, not
formal pleading, is required. Furthermore, requiring a party to state
specifics of fraud in a pleading undermines one of the rationales
underlying Rule 9(b)-to avoid public embarrassment.215
e. Existing Exception to Rule 9(b) Should be Applied to Original
Answers Pleading Inequitable Conduct
Outside of the patent context, courts regularly recognize that Rule
9(b)'s requirements should be relaxed where the information is within
the control of the opposing party.216 Where the defendant controls the
facts, the party asserting fraud need not plead with particularity, but
instead must only "'adduce specific facts supporting a strong inference
of fraud' ... allege that the necessary information lies within the
defendant's control'" and include "'a statement of facts upon which
allegations are based.' ,2 17 Likewise, courts have permitted pleading "on
214. See supra notes 174-76.
215. A party who improperly pleads inequitable conduct may be sanctioned under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11, while a party who improperly includes it in an interrogatory response may be
sanctioned under Fed R. Civ. P. 26 (g)(2) and 37 (c).
216. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Even in cases where fraud
is alleged, we relax pleading requirements where the relevant facts are known only to the"
party accused of fraud); Peters v. Amoco Oil Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
("[T]he heightened pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) may be relaxed somewhat if the
defendant controls information required for proper pleading.") (quoting United States v. E.
Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (M.D. Ala. 1996)).
217. U.S. v. E. Ala. Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404, 1413 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting
U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, Inc., 755 F.
Supp. 1040, 1052 (S.D. Ga. 1990)). A similar rationale underlies the exclusion of fiduciary
duty claims. A case explaining why Rule 9(b) applies to fraud claims, but not breach of
fiduciary duty claims, explained:
The reasons for requiring compliance with Rule 9(b) in fraud claims, but not in
breach of fiduciary duty claims generally, can be understood by considering the
differences between the respective causes of action. Fraud arises from the plaintiff's
reliance on the defendant's false representations of material fact, made with
knowledge of falsity and the intent to deceive. Plaintiffs may fairly be expected to
identify with specificity the defendant's alleged misrepresentations .... Rule 9(b)
thus requires that plaintiffs specifically plead those facts surrounding alleged acts of
fraud to which they can reasonably be expected to have access.
In contrast, the circumstances surrounding alleged breaches of fiduciary duty
may frequently defy particularized identification at the pleading stage .... [T]he
victim of his misconduct often will not, at the time he files his complaint, be in a
position to describe with particularity the events constituting the alleged misconduct.
These facts will frequently be in the exclusive possession of the breaching fiduciary.
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information and belief" where the facts constituting fraud are
particularly within the knowledge of the adverse party, so long as the
party pleading the defense identifies the information upon which the
allegation of fraud is based."'
These exceptions to the strictures of Rule 9(b) would clearly apply
to most inequitable conduct claims, since accused infringers typically
will not have even had access to the prosecution history of the patent
prior to suit being filed, and will rarely have any insight, let alone
information sufficient to satisfy Rule 11, into what information the
applicant possessed but did not disclose to the Patent Office.
However, they have not been applied to inequitable conduct claims.
The only court to even note the fact that inequitable conduct was an
affirmative defense, and not a claim for relief, properly recognized that
by itself that did not mean that inequitable conduct was not covered by
Rule 9(b)."9 However, it failed to consider whether that fact affected
how strictly Rule 9(b) should be applied. If inequitable conduct is
covered by Rule 9(b), these exceptions or relaxed views of the level of
detail required should be applied.
VI. CONCLUSION: BLAME THE INSTRUCTOR, NOT THE STUDENTS
Having concluded that the district courts have been wrong about
everything, it should be emphasized that any blame rests with the
teacher, the Federal Circuit, and not the students-defense counsel or
the district courts. Though charged with bringing uniformity and
coherence to patent law, the Federal Circuit has instead on its watch
waffled on the elements of inequitable conduct, lowered the burden of
proof, and then blamed defense attorneys who relied on its decisions,
saying they had brought a plague on the patent system.
The foregoing teaches that the courts should not apply Rule 9(b) to
inequitable conduct, since it simply does not apply. But to the extent
courts find that I am the poor student in that respect, this Article
teaches how to apply that rule to the unique issue of inequitable conduct
Concha, 62 F.3d at 1503 (citations omitted).
218. MOORE, supra note 203, § 9:03[1][g]; see Videojet Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Eagle Inks, Inc.,
14 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding in inequitable conduct case that
"[a]llegations made 'upon information and belief' are only insufficient if a party also fails to
state the grounds for the suspicion of inequitable conduct.").
219. Chiron Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 156 F.R.D. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Rule 9(b) makes
no exceptions for affirmative defenses or particular types of fraud."). Wright & Miller agree
that it applies to affirmative defenses. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 34, § 1297.
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in a way that fosters the purpose of Rule 9(b) while giving consideration
to the interests of the public and the patent system.
* * *
